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The Corporate Leniency Programme is a fairly new concept in Kenya. It was introduced in 
2017 under section 89A of the Competition Act of Kenya. Cartel activities are becoming very 
dominant and the Competition Authority of Kenya needed to come up with other methods 
of curtailing cartel activities. In the leniency programme, once an entity comes to the 
Authority on a first-come-first-serve basis to confess its involvement in cartel activities, it is 
either pardoned partially or in full. This allows the Authority to conduct its investigations and 
punish the other entities involved. The corporate leniency programme concept was borrowed 
from other jurisdictions such as the UK, USA and South Africa. They have always had this 
system of granting leniency to entities that are the first to approach and confess their 
involvement in cartel activities.  
The study seeks to look at whether the implementation of the leniency programme has been 
effective since its introduction in 2017. The study also examines the challenges that Kenya 
faces and might face in the implementation of the programme. From my research (although 
the programme is still fairly new in Kenya) it is still not yet effective given that amongst other 
challenges, not many people are aware of its existence yet or the steps to take to apply for 
leniency. Due to this, implementation of the programme will be a challenge. In Kenya so far 
there are no reported cases regarding entities that have approached the Competition Authority 
and have been granted leniency.  
Kenya should first introduce an awareness programme that would enable all entities and 
authorities to be on the same page. It will enable everyone to be aware of the programme and 
put it to good use. This is because the knowledge of the existence of the programme may help 
reduce cartel activities as entities may suspect that other entities will approach the 
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1. Introduction to the study 
1.1  Background to the problem 
Looking at the state of the economy in the world before competition law came about, it was a 
pure market economy.1 According to Adam Smiths’ theory of the Invisible Hands, the market 
was free since it was governed by forces of demand and supply of the people in the economy. 
It depended entirely on the willingness of people to pay a certain price for a particular good. 
When the demand of particular goods in a market goes up; the prices also go up making it more 
attractive for producers to continue producing. The entry of new producers increases supply 
therefore reducing the prices.2 The rise of cartels is motivated by the desire to keep supply low 
and increased profit from the resulting higher demand and price. For this profitable status quo 
to be assured, the dominant entities make it difficult for new companies to gain entry into the 
market, thereby increasing supply and lowering demand and price. In this case therefore cartels 
remain a quick solution.3 In a market economy, every individual seeks to provide capital to 
support the domestic industry in order for it to produce the greatest value.4 Such an individual 
has no intention of promoting the public interest and he is not aware of the public interest he is 
promoting. He seeks to promote himself but, in the process, ends up promoting the society.5 
However, if the society’s market is controlled purely by the invisible hand, the merchants in the 
market would take advantage of the lack of regulation and take part in trade practices that may 
lead to introduction of monopolies. In such a situation of a free market, vital goods and services 
could be hijacked and their prices manipulated and controlled by a few producers. This could 
therefore bring about the rise of cartels.6 
Due to the rise of cartels monopolizing the economy, consumers suffer in the process as they 
do not benefit from healthy competition from good prices to good products. According to the 
Black’s Law Dictionary, a cartel takes place when producers combine their products and then 
                                                          
1 Smith A and Seligman E, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, JM Dent & Sons Limited, 
London, 1910,400-401, 400. 
2 Smith A and Seligman E, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, 400. 
3 Pearson Education, Canada, ‘Perfect Competition’, 275 -http://www.sfu.ca/~friesen/park_7e_sm_ch12.pdf. 
4 Smith A and Seligman E, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, 400. 
5  Smith A and Seligman E, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, 400. 
6 Smith A and Seligman E, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, 401. 
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control how they are produced, how they are sold and they further control their prices. The 
producers thereafter obtain a monopoly in a particular industry or products.7  
Cartel activities led to the introduction of competition law to regulate such activities in the 
market.8 Competition law is therefore important because apart from protecting the competitors 
against each other, it also protects the consumers.9 
The Competition Authority of Kenya, hereinafter (“CAK”) regulates competition law in 
Kenya. In curbing the restrictive trade practices, the CAK came up with a leniency programme 
under the Competition Act of Kenya, 2010, hereinafter, (the “Act”).10 Further, given the 
underlying cost of policing multiple companies in a market, for example, the Kenyan market, 
and the fact that the CAK is constrained by financial resources and expertise to discover and 
counteract cartel formation and activities that breach the Competition Act, the concept of 
leniency programme becomes a reasonably commercial tool to compliment enforcement as the 
CAK had to come up with a more strategic plan to better serve Kenyan citizens.11 Generally, 
the leniency programme in Kenya’s competition regime is designed to totally or partially forgive 
a company that has breached competition law rules by engaging in unfair or restrictive trade 
practices, such as being a member of a cartel, and coming forward to confess to the CAK before 
the latter discovers it.12 On coming forward, the cartel member that cooperates with the relevant 
authority receives a total or partial pardon, the quantum of which is decided by the CAK.13As 
earlier said, the confession by the erring company must be furnished before the CAK is aware 
of the offensive practice or is aware but requires further information.14 The CAK ensures 
anonymity and assures any applicant that comes forward that their identity will not be 
disclosed.15 This is in order to encourage more entities to come forward. 
                                                          
7 Black's Law Dictionary, 9th ed. 
8UNCTAD, Research Partnership Platform Competition Law and the State: Summary of answers to questionnaire, 
UNCTAD/DITC/CLP/2015/3, Volume 1, 2015.  
9 Whish R and Bailey D, ‘Competition Law’ Seventh edition, Oxford University Press 2012, 20. 
10 CAK further issued the Leniency Programme Guidelines (“Guidelines”) through the Kenya Gazette No. 4736, 
published on 19 May 2017, to oversee the process of granting of leniency by the Authority. 
11 Competition Authority of Kenya, ‘The Commencement of the Leniency Programme in Kenya’, Newsletter, Issue No. 
2, July, 2017. 
12 Competition Authority of Kenya, ‘The Commencement of the Leniency Programme in Kenya’, 3, Newsletter, Issue 
No. 2, July, 2017. 
13 Section 89A, Competition Act (Act No. 12 of 2010). 
14 Competition Authority of Kenya, ‘The Commencement of the Leniency Programme in Kenya’, 3. 
15 Section 26, Competition Authority of Kenya, ‘Leniency Programme Guidelines’. 
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There are a number of cartels in the market in Kenya that have been pointed out in this chapter. 
Majority of cartels take part in restrictive trade practices such as fixing of prices and allocation 
of markets.16 Price fixing is common in the oil industry and agricultural industry.  
When you look at the situation of the oil industry in Kenya, it is one of the industries that has 
been majorly affected by cartel activities from time to time. The government therefore sought 
to regulate it by creating a specific body to regulate this industry, in this case, the ERC. The 
Energy (Petroleum Pricing) Regulations, 2010, was introduced in order for the government to 
control maximum prices of petroleum products by a formula to be agreed upon by the ERC. 
The OMC’s however are still disputing this approach by the government. Previously the oil 
industry was self-regulatory. The regulation was however introduced because consumers 
complained of frequent increase in prices of oil products between 2004 and 2011. The 
consumers were of the view that the OMC’s were colluding in order to set high oil prices in 
order to make more profits. The OMC’s on the other hand blamed the government regulation 
claiming inefficiency by the government when it came to the tendering process. However, the 
ERC regulation of prices enabled ERC to set the maximum amount of oil prices at retail and 
wholesale prices.17 However, this is not the only industry that is affected by cartels. There was 
also a need to have a general legislation that would regulate all the various industries in the 
economy. 
Another example of cartels was the issue of pharmaceutical companies in Kenya. The National 
Quality Control Laboratory (NQCL) and the Pharmacy and Poisons Board are regulatory 
agencies established in order to make and import pharmaceuticals into the country. Due to 
conflict between both bodies, the task of importing pharmaceuticals fell into the hands of 
cartels. Due to this, there has been exploitation by private individuals such as selling certain 
drugs in quantities that are more than the prescribed quantities which may be harmful to the 
users and may lead to death. Further, it has also led to an increase in importation of counterfeit 
                                                          
16 Section 21, Competition Act (Act No. 12 of 2010). 
17 Munyua JN & Ragui M, ‘Drivers of Instability in Prices of Petroleum Products in Kenya’, Jomo Kenyatta University of 
Agriculture and Technology (JKUAT), Nairobi, Kenya, Prime Journal of Business Administration and Management 
(BAM), 922 −www.primejournal.org/BAM  on 30th March, 2013 . 
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drugs. As it can be seen when such activities fall in the hands of unqualified persons who are 
only in it for profit, it affects the industry at large and the consumers.18 
In the agricultural sector, there is currently a court case involving small scale tea farmers and 
cartels that operate the large scale tea farms.19 The cartels fixed prices of the tea products in 
order to regulate the market thereby denying the small scale farmers their rightful earnings.20  
In such practices, it is usually the small entities that suffer in the hands of the cartels.  
Cartels seek to have control of the market, thereby preventing any new entrants to the market 
from accessing the market in a bid to reduce competition. In most cases, they get involved in 
restrictive trade practices in order to ensure that they have captured a large market size therefore 
creating a monopoly in the supply of goods and services.21 For this reason, the new entrants 
into the market out of desperation, may decide to take part in restrictive trade practices with the 
cartels due to the fear of being prevented from accessing the market.  
Restrictive trade practices as the Competition Act of Kenya 2010 provides include fixing 
purchase prices and also fixing of selling prices directly or indirectly. There is an instance where 
the CAK imposed a fine of Kenya Shillings seven hundred and twenty one thousand, seven 
hundred and fifteen (KES 721,715) on the Association of Kenya Reinsurers after finding it 
guilty of price fixing and for conducting unfair trade practices.22 Another example of a restrictive 
trade practice involves coming up with other similar trading conditions that would enable them 
to control the market23. This is largely seen in the oil industry as previously discussed, where 
the OMC’s exploited the consumers which led to the introduction of the Energy (Petroleum 
Pricing) Regulations, 2010 whereby the government controlled the prices of petroleum 
products.24 The restrictive trade practices further includes dividing markets by cartels by 
allocating themselves customers, allocating themselves suppliers, and further allocating 
                                                          
18 Ireri N, ‘Loopholes Cartels Exploit to Siphon Millions from Govt’ Daily Nation, 15th February 2020 
−<https://www.kenyans.co.ke/news/49778-loopholes-cartels-exploit-siphon-millions-govt> on 15th February, 2020. 
19 The case is still ongoing in court and a final determination is yet to be arrived at. 
20 Governor of Kericho County v Kenya Tea Development Agency & 30 others Ex-Parte Ktda Management Services 
Limited (2016) eKLR. 
21 Elhauge E and Geradin D, Global Competition Law and Economics, Second edition, Hart Publishing, 2011, 284. 
22Wahome M, ‘Authority Fines Group for Underhand Deals’, The Daily Nation (15 April 2015), 
 −< https://www.nation.co.ke/business/Authority-fines-group-for-underhand-deals/-/996/2687164/-/dclii7/-/in>on 
15th April 2015. 
23 Section 21 (3) (a), Competition Act, (Act No. 12 of 2012). 
24 Munyua JN & Ragui M, ‘Drivers of Instability in Prices of Petroleum Products in Kenya’, 922. 
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themselves different areas or specific types of goods and services.25 A market is defined in the 
Competition Authority Guidelines on Relevant Market Definition as the products’ market, which 
constitutes all the goods and services that can be reasonably interchanged or substituted by the 
consumer based on their characteristics, their prices and also their intended use.26 The other 
market is the geographical market which the area that the entities involved take part in the demand 
and supply of goods. Such markets can be distinguished from other market areas based on their 
conditions of competition that vary in the different areas.27 Another restrictive practice would 
also be collusive tendering.28 Further, another practice is the minimum resale price 
maintenance.29 Cartels can further limit production or control production and further control 
market outlets or access to the market. They also control technical development or 
investments.30 They may apply certain conditions that are different to other parties trading in 
the similar field of business thereby placing these parties at a competitive disadvantage.31 To 
determine whether an agreement that is prohibited is taking place, or that a concerted practice 
is taking place between two parties, there is a presumption that one party is seen to own a 
significant interest in the other or one party has at least one director or a substantial shareholder 
in common. This presumption may however be rebutted if the party, the director or the 
shareholder involved is able to establish that there is a reasonable basis that would explain that 
such a practice was a normal commercial activity that was aimed at responding to the 
conditions that were prevailing in the market.32 
They may also conclude contracts setting terms that the contract would only be accepted under 
certain conditions which naturally or according to commercial usage are not connected in any 
way with the contract itself.33 Further, cartels may restrict the use of intellectual property rights 
in such a manner that is not fair or reasonable and is discriminatory.34 When it comes to 
                                                          
25 Section 21 (3) (b), Competition Act, (Act No. 12 of 2012). 
26 Rule 11, Competition Authority of Kenya Revised Guidelines on Relevant Market Definition. 
27 Rule 12, Competition Authority of Kenya Revised Guidelines on Relevant Market Definition. 
28 Section 21 (3) (c), Competition Act, (Act No. 12 of 2012). 
29 Section 21 (3) (d), Competition Act, (Act No. 12 of 2012). 
30 Section 21 (3) (e), Competition Act, (Act No. 12 of 2012). 
31Section 21 (3) (f), Competition Act, (Act No. 12 of 2012). 
32 Ochieng J and Mbedi M, Within Limits: Understanding Restrictive Trade Practices Under the Competition Act, 2010, 
−< https://www.oraro.co.ke/2018/12/12/within-limits-understanding-restrictive-trade-practices-under-the-
competition-act-2010/.  
33Section 21 (3) (g), Competition Act, (Act No. 12 of 2012).  
34 Section 21 (3) (h), Competition Act, (Act No. 12 of 2012). 
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intellectual property, competition increases as businesses continue to come up with new 
inventions. This helps them to strengthen their identity and goodwill therefore promoting 
increasing their competitive edge. Protecting the Intellectual Property rights of a company is 
therefore beneficial in the long term as the success of a business may be attributed to the manner 
in which the Intellectual Property rights of a business are managed, how they are protected and 
how they are commercialized.35 When an applicant for a leniency programme comes forward 
to the CAK to disclose engagement in a restrictive trade practice, the CAK gives the applicant 
a formal acknowledgement36 recording the timing of their application and their priority in the 
application in comparison with other applicants. It then reserves for the applicant a place for a 
period of twenty-eight (28) days while conducting further internal investigation and attempts to 
perfection of its leniency application.37 Priority is given on a first come first serve basis. The first 
applicant is the one who receives the leniency. 
It should be noted however that the application for leniency would only be acceptable when 
certain conditions are fulfilled. The first condition is that the CAK should not in any way have 
any knowledge of the contravention that had taken place.38 Another condition is that if the 
CAK has knowledge of the contravention taking place, it does not have sufficient information 
on the contravention taking place 39 hence the need for more information from a cartel member. 
The final condition is that the CAK has begun investigations but requires further evidence to 
enable it penalize the offenders. Applications are therefore allowed as they will lead to 
introduction of new evidence.40 
To fully qualify for the leniency programme an applicant is required from the time the 
investigations begin until the time a determination is made by the CAK to provide full, timely 
and truthful information.41 The applicant is also required to cooperate fully with the CAK.42 
                                                          
35 Syekei J, Intellectual Property and the new Competition Act in Kenya,− < 
https://www.bowmanslaw.com/insights/intellectual-property/intellectual-property-and-the-new-competition-act-in-
kenya/> 
36 This is known as “Marker” as defined in the Leniency Programme Guidelines. 
37 Competition Authority of Kenya, “Leniency Programme Guidelines” (Under Section 89A of the Competition Act No. 
12 of 2010), 2.  
38Rule 11 (i), Competition Authority of Kenya, “Leniency Programme Guidelines”.  
39Rule 11 (ii), Competition Authority of Kenya, “Leniency Programme Guidelines”. 
40Rule 11 (iii), Competition Authority of Kenya, “Leniency Programme Guidelines”. 
41Rule 12 (i), Competition Authority of Kenya, “Leniency Programme Guidelines”. 
42Rule 12 (ii), Competition Authority of Kenya, “Leniency Programme Guidelines”. 
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The applicant is also required to keep the whole process confidential.43 Finally, the applicant is 
required to stop the conduct of engaging in the practice unless directed otherwise by the CAK.44 
The study seeks to find out how efficient the leniency programme has been since its introduction 
in Kenya. 
1.2  Problem statement 
Kenya decided to adopt the corporate leniency programme as seen in other countries due to 
increased number of cartel activities that are taking place in the country. In most cases, the 
CAK is not aware of the cartel activities taking place. It opted for the leniency programme in 
order to encourage voluntary self-reporting by various entities taking part in cartel activities. 
Even after the introduction of the corporate leniency programme in Kenya, we are still 
experiencing cases of cartels taking part in restrictive trade practices. The dominant entities are 
still taking part in practices that curtail competition in Kenya. The leniency programme only 
applies in cases where the CAK is not aware of the kind of practices taking place. If the CAK 
is aware before an entity comes forward to confess, then the programme would not be 
applicable in such a situation. However, we see that it is not a guarantee that entities will come 
forward and voluntary confess to taking part in the restrictive trade practices and in most cases 
a cartel member only comes forward if the confession would benefit them if they have had a 
falling out with some of the cartel members. Further, some entities may still be participating in 
other cartel activities that the CAK is not aware of and only reports the activities of the cartel 
that is no longer beneficial to them.  
The study looks at whether so far in Kenya there have been situations where entities taking part 
in cartel activities have come forward to confess to the CAK on any restrictive trade practices 
that they have taken part in.  
The study also looks at the legal framework of Kenya to determine whether the implementation 
of the programme has been effective so far.  
                                                          
43Rule 12 (iii), Competition Authority of Kenya, “Leniency Programme Guidelines”. 
44Rule 12 (iv), Competition Authority of Kenya, “Leniency Programme Guidelines”. 
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1.3 Justification of the study  
As explained in the background, the CAK was established in order to regulate competition in 
Kenya and to ensure equality in the market. There are, however, cartels that seek to maintain 
control of the market and the best way to do that is to enter into agreements of restrictive trade 
practices with competitors in order to restrict market access and share. The CAK is usually not 
aware of such restrictive trade practices that are taking place.  
The study looks at whether there is a gap in the competition law of Kenya and the corporate 
leniency programme that hinders effective competition in Kenya. There is the need to analyse 
how effective the legislation has been. This will assist to offer an insight on whether the 
corporate leniency programme would achieve its aim in reducing cartel activities therefore 
enhancing competition in Kenya. 
This is also a fairly new area in Kenya, therefore there is not enough written on this area of 
corporate leniency programme.  This study will therefore be a contribution in this area of law 
in the hope of it being useful to the policy makers involved in enacting the competition laws by 
the use of the recommendations given at the end of this thesis in order to effectively implement 
the programme.  
1.4  Statement of objectives 
The general objective is to examine the role of the corporate leniency programme in promoting 
competition in Kenya.  
The specific objectives include:  
1. Analysing the competition legal framework of Kenya. 
2. Comparing the competition legislation of both South Africa and Kenya and identifying 
the gaps in Kenya’s legislation. 
3. Examining the Competition Act of Kenya and the Corporate Leniency Programme and 
identifying how they can be amended to ensure effectiveness of the leniency programme 




1.5  Research Questions 
1. Is the corporate leniency programme able to fulfill its objective of curtailing cartel activities 
in Kenya? 
2. Is the corporate leniency programme sufficient in promoting competition in Kenya? 
3. What are the challenges facing the implementation of the leniency programme in Kenya? 
4. How can the Kenyan legislation be improved in order to ensure that the corporate leniency 
programme is effective in Kenya? 
1.6  Hypothesis   
The study is based on the hypothesis that the leniency programme guidelines implemented in 
Kenya in 2017 to curb restrictive trade practices has so far had no effect in improving 
competition in Kenya. 
1.7  Literature Review 
1.7.1 Rationale behind Competition Law 
Competition law came about for various reasons as there was need to maintain order in the 
market. According to David P. Fidler, competition law mainly addresses the behaviour of 
private economic entities.45 This is because generally, most of the entities in the market that are 
competing against each other are owned privately by individuals. In most cases however, 
entities owned by the state tend to be monopolies.46 An example in Kenya is the Kenya Power 
and Lighting Company. The entire state relies on it for provision of electricity and it is owned 
by the state. Competition law therefore contains rules directed to regulate competitive 
behaviour of economic undertakings or entities in a market.47 In this case, private economic 
entities.48 
                                                          
45 Fidler D P, ‘Competition Law and International Relations’, The International and Comparative Law Quarterly, Vol. 
41, No. 3, Cambridge University Press on behalf of the British Institute of 
International and Comparative Law, 563 −https://www.jstor.org/stable/760547 on 30th April, 2019.  
46 Most state-owned entities are monopolies because they provide essential amenities that would be required by the 
public. The state monopolises them in order to ensure that the prices are within the reach of the consumers. 
47 Fidler D P, ‘Competition Law and International Relations’, 564. 
48 It is important to note that according to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), in 
most countries, entities owned and operated by the government are exempted from scrutiny by competition law. 
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Several jurisdictions with different economic statuses like the UK49 and USA50 adopted 
competition law for various reasons. Richard Whish and David Bailey emphasized on 
protection of the consumer and that it should be the essential reason for introduction of 
competition law. They also pointed out that when it comes to protecting the consumer, some 
of the requirements such as setting prices at a certain range may not be favourable to the 
producers in the market, thus leading them in some cases to abandon the market.51 Another 
reason for competition law as emphasized by Joyce Karanja would be in order to create a 
market in which the producers and the traders can compete and trade freely in terms of their 
quality of products and services and continue to control their prices.52 Competition law ensures 
that such a conducive environment is created. Therefore, competition law provides an effective 
framework for competitive activities. Its aim is to improve the competitive environment and by 
doing this it creates a conducive environment for carrying out investments thereby promoting 
transfer benefits to the customers in the market. 53 
Competition law also enables wealth redistribution and dispersal of economic power.54 When 
resources are left in the hands of monopolists, it may threaten democracy and it also limits the 
freedom of choice of the consumer and the economic opportunity for alternate producers or 
suppliers.55 Competition law is also intended to protect competitors, especially the small entities 
that are coming up. There is need to protect them against the dominant entities in the market. 
They are to be given a fair chance to succeed.56 Competition law can also prevent the measures 
taken to isolate a domestic market from another. For example, those involved in restrictive 
trade practices such as formation of cartels, banning some exports and also dividing markets 
and sharing of markets would be punished.57 This is because competition law is supposed to 
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regulate market competition. Therefore, those who defy the rules set by competition law will 
have to face consequences.  
There may be other issues that would require attention in the market and competition law 
would be the applicable law to use in regulating. One such issue may be one to do with mergers 
of entities. Competition law may also be applied when it comes to analyzing mergers and 
cooperation agreements. Merger controls may be applied by some states in order to prevent 
foreign corporates from taking over domestic markets.58 
When looking at competition law in a national and international perspective, Fidler points out 
that different states have particular state values.59 He further points out that when an issue goes 
beyond the state, it complicates matters. According to him, there is no supreme authority 
internationally that would keep the member states in line as the government keeps check of its 
citizens. He points out that there is usually anarchy when it comes to dealing with matters 
internationally.60 He advocated for regulation of competition law within a state itself rather than 
involving other states. 
Eleanor M. Fox and Deborah Healey in analyzing competition law came to a conclusion that 
it should apply to state owned enterprises as well as state officials who take part in the restrictive 
trade practices with the cartels. Further, it should also apply to entities that have been accorded 
exclusive privileges and special obligations61 except when it is considered necessary to carry out 
a public mandate.62 
Apart from the positive, there are also negative aspects of competition law. Fidler was of the 
view that that competition law did not have much consideration on how it relates to the 
international environment it operates in.63 Some issues have been discussed such as 
extraterritorial enforcement of competition law but they fail to relate competition law in a 
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broader way. A wider scope covering the international approach was needed.64 Further, it 
should be noted that competition law may grant to the sellers excess market powers thereby 
enabling them to increase their prices above the required levels in the market or lower their 
prices below the required levels in the market.65 
It was clear that Competition Law on its own was not enough when it came to regulating 
competition. There was an increased number of cartels and there was therefore need to discover 
them and get rid of them. 
1.7.2  Cartel Formation 
When looking at formation of cartels, Andrew R. Dick, observed that the evidence showing 
how cartels were formed was very little.66 According to him, it was not easy to get evidence on 
how cartels were formed.  He pointed out that there were studies done earlier that reviewed 
case histories of agreements of price fixing that had been prosecuted in order to determine the 
economic conditions that supported the collusion. According to him, the studies however failed 
to give a clear determination of cartel formation. Most of the samplings were biased which led 
to interpretation of misleading evidence.67  
When an entity can easily access a market, it brings constraints to existing cartels. The entry is 
however slower in industries where the competitive advantage of the big entities exceeds the 
small entities (also known as large economies of scale) and where sunk costs68 are involved. By 
slowing these entries, it increases the time cartels can sustain their supra-competitive profits.69   
The fact that there was little evidence showing the formation of cartels meant that there were 
other ways that the authorities needed to come up with in order to detect the cartel activities. 
This is what led to the formation of cartels hence the introduction of leniency programmes. 
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1.7.3 Rationale Behind Leniency Programmes 
Leniency programmes are seen to have different effects. One effect as pointed out by Joseph E 
Harrington, Jr and Myong-Hun Chang is that it can make cartels less stable and the entity that 
applies for leniency can receive a higher payoff. It is clear that a leniency programme can affect 
the rate of cartel formation by leading to the disabling of the cartels that are active by shutting 
them down and further preventing new cartels from forming.70 Zhijun Chen and Patrick Rey 
also added that when a cartel activity is reported by an entity, there is an amnesty rule that 
would allow the first informant to continue operating even though there is an ongoing 
investigation. According to them, the leniency programme in the US has proven to be the most 
effective tool for antitrust enforcement. The Antitrust Division has been able to easily detect 
several cartels that are international and convict those involved.71   
Secondly, there may be a higher probability of paying penalties by the other entity reported 
against. This is because entities in a cartel that is collapsing would find it more convenient to 
apply for leniency.72  
Thirdly, a leniency programme determines the penalties which the cartel members are likely to 
pay. This is because the firms that apply for leniency usually have their penalties reduced. 
According to Harrington and Chang, leniency programmes assisted in reducing cartel 
formation.73 In some cases, however, there are situations where the leniency programmes may 
instead of leading to a decrease of cartel formation, it leads to an increase.74 To add on this, 
Jeroen Hinloopen and Adriaan R. Soetevent pointed out that such leniency programmes were 
referred to as exploitable. This is because many of the cartel members are given reduced fines 
upon reporting any cartel activities, which leads them to forming more cartels and reporting 
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them continuously. They are of the view that such a programme is too generous therefore 
leading to increased cartel activities.75  
Chen and Rey further added that despite the fact that they have experienced a high success rate 
in the application of the leniency programme, it gives cartels an incentive to break the collusive 
agreements that they are involved in and also denounce the cartel activities, which may lead to 
more ways of creating collusive strategies. They state further that the cartels may abuse the 
programme if too generous. Further, Harrington and Chang were of the view that if the leniency 
programme is actually fully effective in reducing the rate cartels are formed, then they should 
have been able to observe that the duration of the discovery of formation of cartels had reduced 
significantly.76 From their study they are yet to see the significant decrease of cartels since the 
leniency programme was introduced. 
In most cases, cartels that are collapsing are the ones that are involved in leniency 
programmes.77 There may be other cartels that are still active that have not yet been discovered 
and that is why the CAK came up with the leniency programme in order to encourage cartel 
members to voluntarily come forward and disclose such activities that are taking place. We see 
that even if prosecution of a certain cartel entity is going on, it does not mean that it has 
significantly led to a decrease in the cartel numbers. Further, some entities may use the leniency 
programmes to their advantage. A cartel member will decide to apply for leniency if it is of the 
view that it is a better option than the risk of being discovered and convicted.78 Further, it is 
seen that if the leniency programme is too generous, the firms colluding may consider it 
profitable to report their behavior consensually to avoid being detected and subjected to fines.79  
If a cartel member senses there is a danger of being discovered, then it would proceed to the 
authority to exercise the leniency programme. The first one to confess is usually the first one to 
receive priority in the leniency programme therefore an entity may decide to report before the 
other members. This does not therefore mean that the leniency programme can be considered 
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as fully functional or effective. Some entities will use them only if it is seen to benefit them at 
the expense of others.80  
In granting immunity, Eberhard Feees and Markus Walzl were looking at whether the first to 
report can be granted full immunity when investigations were underway. However, they were 
of the view that if an entity is offering relatively little or insufficient evidence, they should not 
be granted full immunity as there is a lot of uncertainty and the investigations may not be 
fruitful. Entities that provide sufficient evidence however are to be granted full immunity as it 
enables predictability. There has to be certainty therefore the evidence has to be sufficient.81 
Similarly, Ikuo Ishibashi and Daisuke Shimizu support this view as they stated that leniency to 
later applicants in cartel activities should be as low as it can possibly be in order to prevent 
incidences where firms collude and only reveal when they are being investigated. They are of 
the view that the authority regulating competition law should be as generous as it can be to the 
first applicant and severe as it can possibly be to the later applicants.82 
Further, according to Leslie M. Marx, Claudio Mezzetti and Robert C. Marshall, when an 
investigation was already open, leniency was not allowed. However, there were some changes 
that were made to the US antitrust programmes in 1993 and the EU leniency programme in 
2002. These changes provided for application for leniency which was granted after an 
investigation had already been opened. This programme targeted multiproduct colluders where 
an entity that was being persecuted for collusion and had not received any leniency could have 
their fines reduced if the entity applied for leniency in a separate condition or product where it 
was involved in collusion with another entity. If such a firm is discovered to be engaging in 
cartel activities with another entity without disclosing the activities, they are prosecuted for 
engaging in the other activities and the penalties are increased.83 
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Looking at the leniency programmes in different jurisdictions, it is clear that it was not fully 
effective and there were certain improvements that were made gradually in order to ensure the 
efficacy of the programme. In the Kenyan context, it is a fairly new programme and that is why 
the study is necessary in order to critically look at it and give recommendations on how to better 
run the programme. 
1.8  Theoretical Framework 
1.8.1 Economic Theory of Fairness 
Adam Smith, a moral philosopher, advocated for economic fairness and was against 
monopolies. He is also greatly linked with the ideologies of free market and open seas. He is 
generally referred to as the father of economics. Smith advocated against corporations that were 
dominant and abusive.84 There is an established Smith’s inquiry that looks at the simple system 
from an individual and how it allocates resources, accumulates resources and reallocates 
resources through free markets in order to promote progress in the market. It is a market model 
that is freely competitive and self-adjusting.85 The simple system looks at the individual freedom 
in comparison with the economic progress of the society.86 He wanted to see how the freedom 
of an individual would affect the progress of the economy. He was very much concerned with 
the progress in a market. Further, according to Smith, there is a thriving market when there are 
specific conditions set out which are bearable to those participating in the market.87 Free trade 
was further emphasized by both John Stuart Mill and David Ricardo. According to Mill, when 
looking at the political economy, whereas he was socialistic, he still had some individualism. 
He advocated for the doctrine of free trade and came up with the famous principle of Laissez- 
faire that advocated for people to look after their own business and that the government should 
intervene only when it is in the public interest and the interference should be very minimal. He 
was very jealous of the interference of the government in economic and industrial matters and 
was of the view that as much as there must be state control, which is inevitable and right, it 
should be to a certain extent. 
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Further, he added that any restrictions on trade and restraint is an evil which does not produce 
the desired results. He also pointed out that there were however some restrictions to the doctrine 
of Free Trade. When it came to freedom, the questions to be asked according to Mill included 
the level of public control that was acceptable in order to prevent fraud. Another question would 
be the extent of sanitary precautions taken, or the arrangements made by employers in order to 
protect employees in dangerous occupations. According to him, such questions involved giving 
liberty as it was better to leave people to be themselves instead of controlling them. Also, when 
it comes to interference with trade, his conclusion was that the interferences were done by the 
buyer and not by the producer or the seller.88  
Ricardo on the other hand came up with the doctrine of comparative advantage. His doctrine 
was also to encourage and justify free trade. He compared two nations that were involved in 
making two different products. According to him, even if one of the nations is seen to be better 
in making both of the products, what would benefit both nations is if one of them made one 
product and the other one made the other product. Both nations would then decide to trade 
with each other instead of competing against each other.89 There was a comparison between 
absolute advantage and comparative advantage. Ricardo gave an example using England and 
Portugal’s production of cloth and wine. Undoubtedly, both countries could produce cloth and 
wine of equal quality. However, there was a possibility that Portugal could produce both wine 
and cloth in a shorter duration compared to England. However, it should be noted that the cost 
of production between both countries is different. In an example given, England would need 
one hundred men to produce cloth in one year and one hundred and twenty men to produce 
wine in one year. Portugal on the other hand would need ninety men to produce cloth in one 
year and eighty men to produce wine in one year. Basically, Portugal had an absolute advantage 
in making cloth due to the few labour hours whereas England had a comparative advantage 
due to the lower opportunity cost it had.90 
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This encourages international trade as the nations will produce more of what they are to export 
and consume less of it. They then import more of what they require from other countries thus 
encouraging trade.91 
Ibn Khaldun, a theorist from Tunisia was also of the same view when it came to free trade. He 
was against the government involvement in commercial activities especially when it came to 
fixing of prices. He stated that when the state buys goods and fixes prices at the lowest possible 
price, it denies other private traders their source of livelihood. It also does not promote 
civilization of the economy. It is seen to increase levels of poverty in the society. He was looking 
at the situation in countries such as Algeria, Egypt and many other parts of Africa.92 
Still on free market, Germinal G. Van, a scholar from Côte d’Ivoire, West Africa, advocated 
for liberalism. He advocated for a liberalized economy in Africa. His theory however is seen to 
have been rejected by African countries as it was seen to favour the European system that was 
seen as oppressive to Africans. Africans saw the Europeans as oppressive and that they wanted 
to maintain their dominance on African countries. It was further argued that the emphasis that 
liberalism puts on the individuals is incompatible with the well-known African culture of 
collectiveness as opposed to individualism. This therefore resulted into restraint and stagnant 
African economies as most African economies were controlled by the government. Later on, 
African countries started to embrace the private property ownership. This led to such countries 
rising and thriving economically.93With regards to monopolies, it is clear that monopolies 
started a long time ago. Smith was against it entirely as it created poor management and did 
not promote fairness in the market. We also see that there was some legislation in the 
government that created room for monopolies.94 Smith also talks about the inequalities in every 
economy. He says that it occurs in three ways. The first one is by restraining the competition in 
certain sectors to a smaller number than what would normally be required; secondly, by 
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increasing some of the sectors beyond what it would usually be; and, thirdly, by obstructing the 
free circulation of labour and stock in every sector and from place to place.95  
The barriers to entry into the market clearly started a long time ago. Acts such as restricting 
competition in the market and obstructing circulation of stock does not promote fairness in any 
market. On the trade restrictions however, Ricardo was of the view that trade restrictions did 
not cut out domestic competition or enable the supposed monopolies to charge more than the 
actual competitive price. The restrictions instead raised the natural price because they increased 
market inefficiency. Also when the cost of production is increased, a section of the labour of 
the country ends up being less productively employed.96  Mill on his view of the monopoly 
problem stated as a solution that any industry with only few competitors should have the 
entities combined and be treated as a public utility or and come under a unified public control 
or direct public operation.97    
Ibn Khaldun, in his economic theory was of the view that in the economy, the prices of goods 
were driven by supply and demand. According to him where goods were scarce, they would go 
at a high price. One would buy goods where they are in surplus and at a lower price and then 
sell them at a higher price where they are scarce and on high demand.98 
When it came to cartels, Smith was of the view that it involved people in the same trade that 
rarely met but their conversation ended up in a conspiracy that was seen to be for the good of 
the public. They may make decisions such as increasing the prices from the required market 
standard. There was no law that could prevent the meetings. Though there can be no law 
hindering people of the same trade from sometimes meeting, it should not do anything to 
support them or treat them as necessary.99 There was a need to find the cartels and prevent them 
from taking part in activities that hindered effective competition in the market. There was also 
the Prisoners’ Dilemma doctrine. In the context of cartels, it could be interpreted that such 
cartels took part in their activities because the members had a reputation of keeping quiet and 
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cooperating when it came to keeping the terms of their agreements. This is also because if they 
decide to disclose the activities, it would reduce their prospects of ever engaging in such 
practices with other entities.100 This is where the various competition law regulations arose in 
various jurisdictions. In our case in Kenya, the Competition Act 2010 of Kenya was established 
in order to control these restrictive trade practices that such cartels may indulge in.  
There was however Karl Marx, a known socialist who was against any form of capitalism. He 
was of the view that competition was violent and would lead to war.101 According to Marx, it 
would stir up competing interests in order to be ahead of their competitor. This leads to 
instances where an entity creates barriers to entry against another in order to prevent them from 
accessing the market in order to reduce competition. 
In as much as the various theorists had their different views, it is important to note that apart 
from Karl Max, they advocated for a free and fair market without interference. They also 
encouraged competition free from monopolies. It was also important to have a proper legal 
framework that regulated activities in the market to avoid unfairness. At the time there was no 
proper legal framework and it was therefore easy to manipulate the market.  
1.8.2 Economic Theory of Deterrence 
When you look deeper into cartels, there is the economic theory of deterrence by Gary Becker, 
where before one commits an economic crime, the firms involved tend to look at the gain they 
would receive from the violation as opposed to the expected punishment. According to Gary, 
deterrence enables an entity to refrain from taking part in such illegal practices as they are 
socially undesirable.102 However, this is not usually the case. This is because when the chances 
of being detected and punished are low, such entities would continue with the illegal practices. 
This theory was challenged by George Stigler. He was of the view that Becker’s theory meant 
that the society should allow efficient crimes or torts.103 This meant that some crimes may be 
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overlooked as long as what the offenders would benefit from it is greater than the harm they 
would cause or the penalty that they would face. Other scholars such as Curry and Doyle 
advanced the theory while also avoiding the issue between Becker and Stingler’s debate. They 
formalized Richard Posner’s suggestion which provided that when you add market exchange 
as a choice between the act of a crime being committed and not doing anything at all, the 
maximization of social welfare is seen as the equivalence of minimizing the cost of the 
committed crime. They argue that the gain the offender has obtained is not part of his cost 
therefore it was not necessary to come to a decision that an offender’s gain should count or not 
count.104 
In this theory of economic deterrence, when you look at the different views, it is clear that 
whereas some advocated for some form of leniency as long as the act does not fully affect the 
victim, others were of the view that doing that would be allowing people to commit illegal acts 
while using it as an excuse. It was therefore advocated that when it came to looking at crimes 
that were committed, instead of looking at the gain of the offender, the crime should be looked 
at for what it was and the punishment was to be given accordingly. 
When you compare it with the study of the leniency programmes, it does not look at the gain 
one has made from the cartel activities, as long as one comes forward and cooperates with the 
authority, they are pardoned. Where one does not cooperate with the authority, the penalties 
are heavy compared to the entities that cooperated with the authority. 
1.9  Methodology 
The study uses the qualitative research method. The method to be used to gather information 
for this paper will be through review and analysis of primary, secondary and tertiary sources of 
literature. The research involves using statistical data to look at whether there are any entities 
that have come out to disclose any cartel activities that they have taken part in and how they 
have been treated. Further, the research involves looking at publications of information on the 
CAK, other reputable organisations, and journal articles on the issue of cartels and leniency.   
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The researcher then looks at the set international standards, practices, and countries that have 
had similar issues in the past or when they were comparably at the stage of Kenya’s 
development and whether it has been effective on their part. 
The researcher looks at South Africa’s leniency programme in order to look at how it works 
and how it has been since its implementation in 2004.  South Africa was the best option as it is 
an African country like Kenya and in large part both countries have certain commonalities in 
their legal thinking and political, socio-economic backgrounds. Though it is comparatively 
more developed, it is more likely to face similar issues as Kenya. 
1.10 Limitations   
A limitation in conducting this study is the fact that the leniency program is fairly new in Kenya. 
It has been two years since its introduction and therefore the period may not be long enough to 
test the full efficacy of the programme. 
Another limitation is due to the sensitivity of some of these cases, it was difficult to get in touch 
with individuals from CAK willing to share any information on the programme so far on any 
applications made or companies involved.  
To mitigate the limitations, I decided to use the qualitative study approach using readily 
available data by looking at the legal framework of Kenya and using South Africa as a case 
study as the data is readily available.  
1.11 Chapter Breakdown 
The objectives of my study will be in four chapters.  
Chapter one is the current chapter which is the proposal and the introductory chapter. It 
introduces the problem and gives the background, the problem statement, the justification of 
my study, the statement of objective, research questions, hypothesis, literature review, 
theoretical framework, methodology and the limitations.  
Chapter two focuses on the legal framework of Kenya by examining the Competition Act and 
the Corporate Leniency Programme of Kenya. It then looks at the loopholes and challenges in 




Chapter three focuses on the legal framework of South Africa by examining the Competition 
Act of South Africa and the Corporate Leniency Policy in South Africa. It also looks at the 
challenges South Africa has faced in running the leniency policy in order for Kenya to borrow 
a leaf from on how to avoid such challenges.  
Chapter four gives the conclusion based on the findings on the research and gives 
recommendations that Kenya should borrow from South Africa’s legal framework in order to 





AN EXAMINATION OF THE COMPETITION LEGAL FRAMEWORK IN KENYA  
2. Introduction 
 
This chapter is on the legal framework of the competition law governing Kenya. The 
competition law evolved from the time Kenya gained independence in 1963 until the time the 
current Competition Act 2010 was enacted. The first Act that Kenya was relying on was the 
Price Control Act, 1956. Further developments led to the Restrictive Trade Practices, 
Monopolies and Price Control Act which eventually led to the enactment of the Competition 
Act, 2010. Kenya at independence was still relying on products from UK until it managed to 
produce its own products for import and export. The progression on the framework of the 
current competition act thereafter led to the enactment of the corporate leniency programme in 
2017. There are however some loopholes in the legal framework that should be addressed. 
These loopholes hinder effective running of the programme. 
2.1  History of Competition Law in Kenya 
 
When Kenya gained its independence in 1963, the level of industrialization was seen to be very 
low.105 Due to this, most of the essential consumer commodities that were needed by the settler 
communities were imported from the UK to support Her Majesty’s motherland. There was also 
a Price Control Regime that aimed to ensure that consumers were not exploited by the tendering 
process106 by the Price Control Act.107 
Thereafter, Kenya continued developing its economy by establishing import substitution 
industries to enable Kenya and the East African Communities to meet their requirements.108 
There was also the transfer of firms owned by foreigners to Kenyans. This led to the enactment 
of the Trade Licensing Act,109 that legalized takeover of foreign owned entities to Kenya by 
                                                          
105 Njoroge P M, ‘Enforcement of Competition Policy and Law in Kenya Including Case Studies in the Areas of Mergers 
and Takeovers, Prevention of Possible Future Abuse of Dominance and Collusion/Price Fixing’, 2  
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107 Enacted on 16th October, 1956. 
108 Njoroge P M, ‘Enforcement of Competition Policy and Law in Kenya Including Case Studies in the Areas of Mergers 
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109 Cap 497 of the laws of Kenya. 
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Kenyan citizens through denying trading licences to certain businesses and trades.110 There was 
also the legalization of control of import and export of goods and control of essential supplies 
under Imports, Exports and Essential Supplies Act.111   
Kenya’s commercial activities were thereafter controlled by the Price Control Act, the Trade 
Licensing Act and the Imports, Exports and Essential Supplies Act. The latter act provided for 
restrictive practices such as fixing of prices of some certain types of goods and services. The Act 
also provided for the transferring of certain business enterprises from being owned by foreigners 
to being owned by Kenyan citizens. The Act also provided for industries of imports substitution. 
The Act further provided for licensing for imports and exports. Further, it provided for the 
establishment of import quotas for some types of goods. The Act also provided for full 
prohibition of importation of certain goods. The Act also provided for letters of no objection. 
The Act further provided for the allocation of foreign exchange and also fixed exchange rates.112 
There was the East African Community collapse that led other countries such as Tanzania and 
Uganda to import their products from other countries such as China.113 This affected Kenya as 
it lost its market from Tanzania and Uganda. It could not compete with the other countries as 
it had high prices, low quality commodities and poor packaging and design. Kenya therefore 
needed to improve its marketability and competition.114 The government decided to expose 
Kenya to domestic market competition. It did so by allowing certain imports in Kenya that 
were not previously allowed. This would also enable them to be prepared to take part in 
competition in the export market.115 Some imports that were considered competing were 
allowed in Kenya and some items that had been banned were removed from the banned list. 
Items that had their prices controlled were removed from the price control list.116 There was 
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also the addition of industries that were licensed in order to promote domestic competition. 
They also reduced prices for consumers and they increased opportunities for getting 
employment. They further improved their efficiency when it came to the usage and allocating 
scarce resources to the competing needs of individuals.117  
Consequently, there was a proposal to develop a competition policy and regulation by the 
Working Party on Government Expenditures (WPGE) in 1982. In its report, (WPGE) stated 
that there would be greater reliance on policy instruments that would influence farm 
management as well as influence industrial decisions to be made on product selection, 
investments and also employment. Further, the report stated that there was an increase in 
private sector activities and there was also an increase in the scope and magnitude of 
community efforts. According to the report, this may create opportunities for abuse, favoritism 
and exploitation.118 
Kenya had slowly begun to shift from a regime with price control to a market economy. It was 
therefore important to have law in place regulating competition. In 1989, the Restrictive Trade 
Practices, Monopolies and Price Control Act was introduced.119  
2.2  Current law governing Competition in Kenya  
 
Currently, the Competition Act, 2010120 governs competition in Kenya. This Act was previously 
known as The Restrictive Trade Practices, Monopolies and Price Control Act.121 The Act’s 
mandate was later on increased to cover consumer protection122 and abuse of dominant 
position.123 The Competition Act established the CAK.124 Its main role is to regulate 
competition activities in Kenya. Further, it is expected of the CAK to act independently and 
impartially and perform all its functions without fear of anyone or favoring anyone.125 It is 
                                                          
117 Njoroge P M, ‘Enforcement of Competition Policy and Law in Kenya Including Case Studies in the Areas of Mergers 
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122 Section 55, Competition Act (Act N0. 12 of 2010).  
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important to note that there have not been any significant amendments since the incorporation 
of the Restrictive Trade Practices, Monopolies and Price Control Act until the enactment of the 
Competition Act in 2010. This raises the question as to whether the competition legislation is 
very effective and therefore did not need any amendments. One could also argue that before 
legislation is amended in Kenya in order to cater for regularly arising matters, it usually takes a 
long time. The latter argument would render Kenya’s legislation ineffective as it does not 
regularly cater for new arising matters. 
The Act further provides the punishment to anyone taking part in any of these practices as 
imprisonment for a term that does not exceed five years or payment of a fine that does not 
exceed ten million Kenya shillings or may be subjected to both the imprisonment and the fine.126  
As much the Competition Act provides for the restrictive trade practices it also provides for 
exceptions on when the restrictive practices are allowed. The undertaking is required to apply 
for the exemption in the manner that is prescribed together with any information that the CAK 
would require.127 The CAK then publishes a notice in the Gazette of such an application 
indicating the nature of exemption that an entity sought and requiring any interested persons 
to submit to the CAK within 30 days any written representations they would wish to make 
regarding the application.128 The CAK then looks at the exemption and decides whether to grant 
the exemption or not grant giving reasons.129 Some of the factors that CAK may look at before 
granting an exemption to participate in restrictive trade practice are whether the practice would 
maintain or promote exports.130 It should not change the status of the exports. The CAK also 
checks on whether granting the exemption would improve or prevent a decline when it comes 
to producing and distributing goods or providing services.131 Further, the CAK looks at whether 
granting the exemption would promote technical or economic progress or stability in any 
industry.132 In addition, whether the exemption would benefit for the public in a manner that 
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outweighs the lessened competition that may result from such an agreement or a concerted 
practice.133 
The CAK can further amend or revoke the grant of exemption if it is satisfied that it was granted 
on incorrect or misleading information or there has been a material change in granting of the 
exemption or a condition in which the exemption was granted has not been complied with.134 
In this case, one could argue the effectiveness of the exemptions. Despite what is provided for 
in the Act, there may be some cases of abuse as some entities may find some loopholes that 
would enable them apply for the exemptions. In addition to that, it also would have to rely on 
the integrity of the members of the CAK. Some entities may collude with members of the CAK 
in order to apply for the exemption. 
The Act does not restrict the restrictive trade practices to the practices that only take place in 
Kenya. Even if the conduct takes place outside the Kenyan jurisdiction, as long as it involves a 
Kenyan Citizen or a company incorporated in Kenya, the Act still applies to the restrictive 
practices.135 
Apart from the Competition Act, The East African Community (EAC) enacted East African 
Community Competition Act which also applies to Kenya.136 Further, the Common Market for 
Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), also governs competition in Kenya under the 
provisions of the COMESA Competition Commission (CCC) Regulations (the COMESA 
Regulations).137 The COMESA Competition Commission signed an agreement of cooperation 
in April 2016 with the CAK. One of the issues specified in the agreement was that both 
authorities would share information regarding investigations that would concern the other 
regulator’s jurisdiction.138 
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2.3 Corporate Leniency Programme in Kenya 
2.3.1 Rationale for Corporate Leniency Programme in Kenya  
 
The leniency programme was introduced in Kenya in order to achieve five main aims. The first 
one is deterrence.139 It was intended to make cartel membership unattractive as the members 
would fear that one of their fellow members would report their activities to the CAK.140 This is 
because cartels are formed on the basis of trust. If cartel members stop trusting their fellow 
members, it prevents them from taking part in cartel activities. This is also seen as a cost-
effective tool for investigation by the CAK.141  
Another reason the leniency programme was introduced is detection.142 Once a member of a 
cartel applies for leniency it leads to investigations. Some other members of the cartel may 
decide to confess later on before investigations are open against other cartel members in the 
hope of being granted leniency.143 
The third reason for leniency is sanctioning.144 When one comes forward with a confession, they 
provide to the CAK firsthand information that they would have difficulty obtaining. Once the 
CAK obtains this information, it makes it easy to prosecute the cartel members and come up 
with the appropriate financial penalties.145 
The fourth reason the leniency programme was introduced was in order to ensure 
cessation.146Once a member of a cartel applies for leniency, they cease to participate in the 
activity. They may also stop participating because they may fear that another member has 
already applied or will be intending to apply.147 
The final reason for a leniency programme is cooperation.148 The programme is seen to promote 
international cooperation with other countries when it comes to investigation of cartels. This is 
                                                          
139 This is provided in Section 13 of the “Leniency Programme Guidelines” (Kenya). 
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because when one applies for leniency, they are also required to state in which other jurisdiction 
leniency has been sought and applied and they are to also provide a waiver in order to allow 
the competition agencies to communicate.149  
The five aims stated above were in order to ensure that cartel activities were curtailed.  
2.3.2 Application of the Corporate Leniency Programme  
 
As explained in the chapter 1, the CAK in most cases is not usually aware that there are certain 
restrictive trade practices taking place hence the introduction of the leniency programme.150 The 
programme was introduced in Kenya under section 89A of the Competition Act.151  Apart from 
the CAK, the Competition Tribunal hears matters that arise from the CAK.152 The final hearing 
from any disputes is the High Court of Kenya.153 The challenge here is how effective this system 
is especially when the matter goes to the High Court. This is because the parties have no channel 
for seeking further redress once the matter is determined by the High Court. 
The leniency programme guidelines provide for different kinds of leniency. There is the 
conditional leniency.154 This is the original immunity given to the applicant temporarily after 
effective application for leniency. Before being granted conditional immunity, the CAK has to 
be satisfied that material proof and data that will assist in the inquiries, conclusions, choices 
and subsequent proceedings has been provided by the applicant.155 The applicant is required to 
cooperate fully with the CAK and follow the conditions as provided for in the guidelines.156 
Leniency is granted as ‘first through the door’.157 It applies to the first person to come to the 
CAK with a confession regarding their participation in a cartel. Such a person qualifies for 
conditional immunity when according to the CAK’s satisfaction, they have provided required 
evidence that is sufficient. There is also the ‘full, total or permanent leniency’ granted to the 
applicant after they have received conditional leniency and the entire investigation process has 
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been completed and a final determination issued. The applicant is granted 100% immunity 
when the investigation is completed.158 
The guidelines provide that an undertaking is eligible to apply for its leniency through the legal 
entity in through which it was incorporated. That entity should be the one controlling its 
decision-making processes. This also covers the directors and the employees on condition that 
they are in full cooperation with the CAK.159 The applicant should show that it had not coerced 
other parties to take part in the restrictive practice with it.160 In the event that a subsidiary applies 
for leniency, it would only be eligible for leniency in accordance with its involvement in the 
restrictive practice. It would not be eligible for leniency for the participation of the parent 
company. This is because the parent company is not under its subsidiary.161 Further, if a parent 
company applies for leniency, it would be eligible for leniency in accordance with its 
involvement in the restrictive practice and eligible as well as to its subsidiary’s participation in 
the restrictive practice. This is due to the fact that the parent company controls the subsidiary 
company.162 A parent company would therefore benefit from the leniency on its own 
application and the application of its subsidiary.163 
When it comes to joint venture entities, leniency can only be granted to one entity in the joint 
venture and not both entities. However, if a particular joint venture is regarded as a separate 
entity that two parent companies control, it is considered eligible to apply for leniency. 
However, for the two parent companies, they are eligible to apply for leniency as they are not 
controlled by the joint venture.164 It is important to note however that when a joint venture is 
involved in a in a restrictive practice, one of the parent company’s application for leniency does 
not cover the joint venture. This is because both parent companies control the joint venture 
therefore it cannot lie on only one parent company.165  
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The CAK only accepts applications for leniency on the condition that it is not aware of the 
restrictive practice taking place.166 If the CAK already knew of the restrictive practice, it will not 
grant the application for leniency. However, if the CAK was aware of the restrictive practice 
taking place, leniency is granted to an applicant if the CAK does not have enough information 
to carry out an investigation.167 The applicant would therefore be required to provide further 
information that will assist the CAK to conduct an investigation. Another condition is that if 
the CAK has begun conducting an investigation but requires additional evidence. They may 
allow applications as long as they lead to the introduction of new evidence.168  
When an application for leniency is made, a formal acknowledgement known as a ‘marker’ is 
granted by the CAK showing the record of timing by the applicant in comparison with other 
applicants. This ensures that it reserves for the applicant a position for a period of twenty-eight 
days. The CAK then continues with its internal investigations in order to make good the 
leniency application.169 During this twenty-eight-day period, the applicant is required to submit 
relevant information. Such information is submitted either orally or in writing.170 Further, after 
the expiry of the twenty-eight days, the applicant can seek an extension if they have not been 
able to make good the leniency application due to unavoidable circumstances.171 The CAK 
thereafter holds an initial meeting with the applicant after they have made good the application. 
The applicant may bring forward any relevant information and answer questions asked by the 
CAK.172 The CAK is further required within fourteen days to communicate to the applicant in 
writing informing them if they qualify for leniency or not.173 
On the application of leniency and throughout the whole process of investigation, the applicant 
is required to provide full information that is truthful and timely; the applicant is also required 
to cooperate fully; the applicant is also required to keep the entire application process 
confidential; further, the applicant is required to immediately stop taking part in the restrictive 
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practice unless the CAK directs otherwise.174 This programme therefore relies on the 
information and the truthfulness of a cartel member involved. 
Leniency is also granted at a first come first serve basis. The first applicant may be granted 
immunity, which is 100% reduction in penalties. The second applicant may be granted a 
reduced penalty that is up to 50%. Further, the third applicant may be granted a reduced penalty 
of up to 30%. Subsequent applicants before the investigation is completed are granted a 
reduction in penalties that is up to 20%.175 
The CAK further takes all the necessary steps to ensure that the applicant’s identity remains 
confidential throughout the whole process.176 In the event that an applicant granted conditional 
leniency is in breach of certain terms, the CAK may revoke it. Before revoking, the CAK writes 
to the applicant informing them of the breach giving the applicant an opportunity to correct the 
breach before the conditional leniency is revoked. The obligation to cooperate on behalf of the 
applicant is also suspended.177 When the CAK revokes the conditional leniency of an applicant, 
it may further pursue the matter according to the provisions of the act.178  
An entity may also enter into an agreement for settlement with the CAK on the award of 
damages to the complainant and any amount proposed as a pecuniary penalty.179 
2.4 Cooperation with Regional Bodies 
 
Kenya is also in cooperation with the EAC and COMESA. The CAK is to work in cooperation 
alongside other authorities in order to curb cartels. COMESA has experienced some challenges 
when it comes to running the programme which Kenya should take note of. For instance, the 
capacity to handle requests for information from other jurisdictions is inadequate. This 
inadequacy is caused by lack of enough resources and also lack of enough human capacity.180 
Another challenge is the fact that the various jurisdictions have different laws therefore there is 
lack of harmonization of the laws between the different countries and their approaches and also 
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enforcement methods.181 Another challenge is that there are certain legal restrictions that 
prevent sharing of information. Due to those restrictions, it makes cooperation with other 
countries difficult.182 A further challenge is that there are legal restrictions when it comes to the 
admissibility of information from the other jurisdictions in national courts. This also makes it 
difficult to cooperate with various countries.183 There are also several sovereignty issues and 
there was the need to domesticate COMESA regulations.184 Another challenge is also the lack 
of mutual interest by the countries to promote formal cooperation.185 
2.5 Loopholes in Kenya’s Legal Framework 
2.5.1 Competition Act (Act No. 12 of 2010) 
There are some loopholes noted in the Competition Act that should be addressed in order to 
ensure effective running of the programme.  
There is the established Competition Authority and the Competition Tribunal under the 
Competition Act. Anyone that is aggrieved by the decision of the CAK can appeal to the 
Tribunal.186 Any appeal from the Tribunal goes to the High Court. The CAK, if dissatisfied or 
aggrieved by the decision of the Competition Tribunal may lodge an appeal against the decision 
in the High Court.187 Due to lack of a specialized court for hearing competition matters, the 
determination of matters may take time as the High Court also has several other matters to 
attend to that are not in competition law. This also increase the backlog of the cases in court. 
Another loophole is that the Competition Act provides that any aggrieved party may appeal to 
the High Court. The High Court’s decision is final.188 There is no room to further in case of 
dissatisfaction appeal to the Court of Appeal or even the Supreme Court. This leaves a party 
aggrieved without further room for seeking redress. 
Another gap noted is the aspect of accountability. It is not expressly provided for who the CAK 
and the Tribunal are accountable to for their actions and decisions.  
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Further, when you look at the penalties’ sections of the Competition Act, the Act only provides 
for penalties where one is convicted for taking part in restrictive trade practices.  
The amount is not less than 10 million Kenya Shillings or a term of imprisonment of a period 
that does not exceed 5 years.189 These penalties are only for the entities that are taking part in 
restrictive trade practices. The Act does not provide for penalties when one does not comply 
with an order that is given by the CAK or the Competition Tribunal. 
2.5.2  Corporate Leniency Programme Guidelines  
 
When you look at Kenya’s corporate leniency programme guidelines, it has shortcomings that 
may make it difficult to smoothly run the programme. Those shortcomings pose as the 
challenges that deter the programme from running smoothly in Kenya hence prevent it from 
being implemented effectively.  
The leniency programme does not provide for recognition of an occurrence that some entities 
may not be aware that the conduct they taking part in is illegal. They may be subjected to fines 
and punishment for innocently taking part in a cartel conduct. Further, when they become 
aware that the conduct is illegal, they may not want to come forward and confess that they were 
taking part in it as they have no assurance that they will not be penalized.   
The leniency programme does not also specifically provide for who an applicant should be. 
This makes it difficult to know the person who is legible in the firm to apply for leniency as it 
only provides for an applicant generally.190  
When it comes to granting of immunity, the leniency programme only provides for reduction 
of fines for the applicants who were not the first to approach the CAK.191 It is not provided for 
that if the matter goes to the Tribunal, the CAK would step in and ask for significant treatment 
on behalf of the other applicants as they also cooperated. The fines may be reduced by the CAK 
but when it reaches the Tribunal it is not a guarantee they will be granted the same leniency. 
Further, when you look at the programme, there is no such provision that once granted 
immunity in another jurisdiction one would have to apply afresh in Kenya or if one is pardoned 
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for one activity it does not apply to another activity. This leads to uncertainty as one is not 
aware if they would be required to apply afresh if already granted immunity in another country 
or if when granted for one activity it should extend to others. 
Further, the programme provides that when one is granted immunity from criminal prosecution 
and their fines are reduced, there is no provision whether an aggrieved party may still seek civil 
or criminal suit against them. It is not clear whether the applicant is completely scot free or 
another party aggrieved by their cartel activity may institute a suit against them. 
The leniency programme does not further provide for what should happen to an applicant 
whose application is unsuccessful or whether CAK is at liberty to grant other approaches to 
unsuccessful applicants. This may discourage other applicants from applying in the event they 
are unsuccessful. 
When it comes to communication, the programme does not expressly provide for 
communication with the applicant informing them that another applicant had already come 
forward. It only provides for the applicant being informed within fourteen days that their 
application for leniency is not successful.192 It is therefore not clear as to whether they are 
informed that another applicant has come forward and was successful. Further, after the 
application is rendered successful, the applicant then meets with the CAK193 though there is no 
clear timeline as to when the meeting is to be scheduled. 
When it comes to setting a meeting with the commission, the programme only gives the 
requirements of the initial meeting with the CAK until the final meeting on the surface. The 
guidelines do not clearly provide what is expected during the meetings. The programme only 
provides for the initial meeting that the CAK is to peruse documents and inform the applicant 
on whether its application for immunity has qualified within fourteen days.194 There are no 
further details of requirements such as the full identity of the applicant. One is also not sure on 
when further evidence can be introduced.  
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Further, the guidelines do not go in depth on the investigation and analysis. It only provides 
that the CAK would undertake the investigation and the applicant is to cooperate.195 It is not 
clear on the methods the CAK would use to conduct an investigation, whether they will carry 
out interviews or such other methods. 
In the final meeting with CAK, the applicant is required to sign the leniency contract.196 There 
is no mention of what the CAK intends to do with the information provided neither does it 
further mention what is to be required of the applicant. It also does not mention any 
repercussions of the applicant withdrawing its application at this stage. 
2.6 Conclusion 
 
This chapter was looking at the legal framework of Kenya with regards to competition law. 
There have been progressive developments from the enactment of the first Act, until the 
enactment of the Competition Act of Kenya. The Corporate Leniency Guidelines were derived 
from the current Competition Act. The guidelines were enacted in 2017 but as of 2020, there 
are no reported cases of any entities that have come forward to apply for entity and have been 
granted leniency. The framework also has some loopholes that need to be addressed in order to 
ensure effective running of the leniency programme. 
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This Chapter is on the legal framework of South Africa. It had a strong market economy mostly 
foreign based and therefore needed to develop laws that would protect the local industries. The 
first Competition Act was enacted in 1998 and has had three amendments since its enactment. 
The Corporate Leniency Policy was introduced in 2004 and later on amended in 2008 to 
address certain gaps. Since the introduction of the policy, South Africa has so far reported 54 
leniency applications. South Africa has also had some challenges that it has faced when it comes 
the running the policy therefore not rendering it fully effective.    
3.1 History of Competition Law in South Africa 
South Africa, being an African country like Kenya has been seen to be more advanced in 
developing their laws in comparison to Kenya. There were several foreign investors attracted 
to their resources thereby leading to economic policies that were intended to protect the foreign 
investors.197 There were also certain risks of overspecialization and the government further 
introduced policies aimed at reducing dependence on the mining sector by encouraging other 
sectors such as agricultural and local manufacturing sectors to emerge.198 The mining 
manufacturing industries and also the local industries would therefore need to be regulated 
hence the adoption of Competition law. 
The Competition Act no. 89 of 1998 regulates competition law in South Africa. So far it has 
had three amendments. The first amendment is by the Competition Amendment Act, No. 35 
of 1999 (it commenced in 1 September 1999); Competition Amendment Act, No. 15 of 2000 (it 
commenced in 1 September 2000); and Competition Second Amendment Act, No. 39 of 2000 
(it commenced in 1 February 2001).199  
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The Competition Act established the Competition Commission which had the main aim of 
investigating, controlling and further evaluating restrictive trade practices in South Africa.200 It 
also monitors abuse of dominant positions and also regulates mergers.201Apart from the 
Commission, there is also established the Competition Tribunal and the Competition Appeal 
Court.202 The function of the Tribunal is to adjudicate matters concerning competition and 
giving a determination.203 The Appeal Court on the other hand hears appeals from the Tribunal 
and gives a determination.204 The Commission, the Tribunal and the Appeal Court are 
accountable to the South African Department of Economic Development.205 
South Africa’s Competition law prescribes for the punishment that one is to face if found 
contravening certain provisions of the Act. The offender is subjected to punishment of a fine 
that does not exceed R500 000-00 or sentenced to imprisonment for a term that does not 
exceed10 months. The offender may also be subjected to both the fine and sentenced to 
imprisonment.206 Other offenders in relation to the Act are subjected to a punishment of a fine 
that does not exceed R2 000-00 or subjected to imprisonment for a term that does not exceed 6 
months. The offenders may also be subjected to both the fine and sentenced to imprisonment.207  
The Act also provides for instances where entities can apply for exemptions in order to take 
part in the restrictive trade practices frowned upon.208 An entity may approach the Commission 
to apply for an exemption which meets the requirements prescribed.209 The Commission can 
thereafter grant an exemption, whether conditional or unconditional; or refuse to grant an 
exemption.210 The exemption can be granted for a specified time211 and may be revoked at any 
time if the information given regarding the exemption was false or where the requirement for 
the condition given is not adhered to or has not fully been met. An example of an instance 
where an exemption is usually granted is if the conduct the exemption is sought for is for an 
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objective that is non- commercial and socio-economic.212 Further, if the reason for granting the 
exemption ceases to exist, the exemption may be revoked.213 Further, the Commission is 
supposed to issue a notice through the gazette before granting or revoking an exemption and 
give reasons for granting or intention to revoke. This enables affected parties to respond within 
twenty days of the notice to provide their presentations in written form explaining why the 
exemption should not be issued or why it should not be revoked.214 The Commission thereafter 
is to issue a notice of any exemption issued or any revocation made through a gazette notice.215 
3.2 Corporate Leniency Policy in South Africa 
As mentioned in chapter 1, the rationale for a leniency programme was in order to assist the 
body set to regulate competition to curb restrictive trade practices that they may not be aware 
are taking place. The corporate leniency policy in South Africa was established in 2004216 to 
maintain competition and prevent restrictive trade practices.217 
The policy was amended in 2008218 in order to incorporate some leniency features that it did 
not contain but were contained in other jurisdictions.219 A few of the reasons as to why it was 
important to amend the policy in 2008 was because the previous version of the policy was not 
clear and certain.220 The revised version made it clear that immunity would apply only when 
the conditions set out in the policy were met.221 It did not rely on the discretion of the 
Commission as in the previous version. This was beneficial as it applied to anyone who 
cooperated with the Commission instead of allowing room for bias when granting immunity. 
The scope of the application of the policy was further increased to also apply to the instigators 
and the coercers of a cartel therefore making all the members of a cartel eligible222 to apply for 
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immunity whether they were the ring leaders or not.223 It was not limited to only the leaders of 
a cartel.  
The amended policy also introduced the marker procedure, which was not in the previous 
version. The marker224 is intended to secure the applicant’s position in the queue for being 
granted immunity. Once the marker is granted, it determines the amount of time that is required 
in order to provide the necessary information, documents and evidence needed.225 This is also 
because at that point, the applicant may not be having the sufficient information that is required. 
The marker therefore enables them to secure a place in the queue and later on provide the 
required information needed at a later time after the marker is granted. The amendment of the 
policy further gave room to application for immunity orally instead of restricting it to a written 
application.226 
The amendment to the policy also made it clear that the division responsible for receiving and 
dealing with the applications for immunity is the Exemptions and Enforcement Division.227 
This had not been made clear before in the previous policy version.  
The policy is applied to alleged cartels in the country. It is also applicable to other jurisdictions 
if the activities taking place there affects South Africa as well.228 Further, it should be noted that 
just because immunity has been granted in one jurisdiction, it is not a guarantee that South 
Africa will also grant immunity. One is required to apply afresh for immunity in South 
Africa.229Further, different cartel activities warrant separate applications for leniency for each 
activity. If one receives immunity for a particular activity, it does not extend to the other 
activities as well.230 
It is important to note that it is the firm and not individual employees allowed to apply for 
leniency.231 The policy will not apply if the entity that came forward was the one that instigated 
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the cartel.232 The policy will also not be applicable in cases where the activities of the cartel fall 
outside the ambit of the act.233 It will also not apply where another firm has made an application 
that is successful in respect of the same conduct. Further, it will not apply where the applicant 
does not meet the conditions as they have been set out in the policy.234 In such a case, the 
Commission uses the approach where unsuccessful applicants may attempt to settle with the 
Commission and also attempt negotiations through a settlement agreement and consent order 
that may result into the fine being reduced.235 
The policy also gives room for applicants who are unsure whether their applications will be 
successful. They are still encouraged to apply hypothetically to the Commission to enable them 
get clarity either through telephone conversation or in writing. The firm has an option of 
remaining anonymous.236 If the firm chooses to disclose its identity at that point in time, the 
Commission no longer has a duty to protect its identity. However, the information received by 
the Commission will continue to be treated with confidentiality.237 It is also important to 
identify cartel conduct in order to determine whether certain applications relate to the same 
contravention. The Commission looks at the product or service and compares it with the alleged 
contravention and the entities involved.238 
When it comes to granting immunity, it is not automatic that an applicant will be granted 
immunity. It is only offered to an applicant that meets all the requirements as set out by the 
Commission. 239 An applicant that is successful is first granted conditional immunity as it awaits 
the determination of the proceedings. When the proceedings are finalized, the applicant is 
granted either total immunity or receives no immunity at all.240 This is after the matter has been 
referred to the Tribunal by the Commission and the Tribunal or Appeal Court has made the 
final determination.241 The first one to apply for immunity before the Commission is the first 
                                                          
232 Moodaliyar K, ‘Are Cartels Skating on Thin Ice? An Insight into the South African Corporate Leniency Policy’, 160. 
233 Section 7.1.1, Corporate Leniency Policy (South Africa). 
234Section 7, Corporate Leniency Policy (South Africa).  
235Section 7.2, Corporate Leniency Policy (South Africa). 
236Section 8.1, Corporate Leniency Policy (South Africa). 
237Section 8.2, Corporate Leniency Policy (South Africa). 
238 Lavoie C, ‘South Africa’s Corporate Leniency Policy: A Five-Year Review’, 4. 
239 Moodaliyar K, ‘Are Cartels Skating on Thin Ice? An Insight into the South African Corporate Leniency Policy’, 159. 
240 Section 9, Corporate Leniency Policy (South Africa). 
241 Section 9.1.1, Corporate Leniency Policy (South Africa). 
43 
 
one to receive immunity provided that they have met the conditions as stated in the policy.242 
This first through the door policy creates a race between entities when it comes to applying for 
leniency before the Commission.243  
It is reported that the Commission had received fifty-four (54) leniency applications since the 
policy was introduced in 2004. After the policy was amended in 2008, there has been significant 
increase in the application for leniency. The marker procedure has also led to the increase of 
several applications.244 The fact that South Africa has only received 54 applications since its 
implementation in 2004 means that is the policy is not as effective and there is need to improve 
on it in order to increase the number of applications. 
It is also important to set a strict review process before granting immunity to the applicants.245 
Certain conditions have to be met by an applicant when it comes confessing its involvement in 
a cartel. The information given in conjunction with all the evidence and documents pertaining 
cartel involvement must be complete and truthful.246 The applicant should be the first one to 
come before the Commission with the all the relevant information, evidence and any 
documents that would enable the Commission to initiate the proceedings.247 The Commission 
should not be aware of the contravention taking place.248 However, if the Commission is aware 
of the contravention, but does not have sufficient information and no investigation has been 
initiated.249 In this case the applicant should have sufficient information or evidence that will 
assist the Commission in initiating an investigation.250 Further, if investigations have already 
been initiated, and the Commission does not have sufficient evidence to prosecute251, an 
applicant may provide more evidence to assist in the investigation.252  It is however argued that 
the circumstances create a burden to the applicant that is onerous to have them provide the 
information that is required by the Commission to enable successful prosecution of a cartel. 
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The policy does not provide for an instance whereby an applicant is a new entrant into the cartel 
and comes forward to apply for leniency but does not have the required information that would 
bring a case that is successful against such a cartel. As such, such an applicant would not qualify 
for leniency.253 
The applicant is required to fully co-operate with the Commission until it finalises the 
investigations and it concludes the proceedings.254 The applicant is also required to stop taking 
part in the cartel activity it was taking part in and is required to act in a manner that the 
Commission will direct.255 In addition, the applicant is to be discrete and not alert their fellow 
cartel members that it has applied for immunity.256 Further, the applicant is also not to destroy, 
give false information or even hide any information, evidence or documents that are in relation 
to the cartel activities.257 The applicant is also not to misrepresent any material facts of the 
activities of the cartel or act in a dishonest manner.258 
The aim of the leniency policy was to encourage self-reporting and ensure that any member 
who willingly approaches the Commission to confess is not subjected to prosecution in the 
event that proceedings are instituted against cartel members.259 The most ideal time an entity is 
encouraged to apply for immunity is at its own free will, when the Commission is not aware of 
the contravention that is taking place.260 When it comes to admission of taking part in cartel 
activities, it is important to note that lack of admission would defeat the purpose of the leniency 
policy. An applicant would be required to admit to being in contravention of the Act after they 
sign a conditional immunity agreement once the Commission determines that it qualifies for 
immunity. During this period, the applicant is expected to have had enough time to internally 
investigate its conduct and is therefore able to admit that it was involved in a cartel conduct.261 
The leniency policy also recognizes the fact that not all the firms taking part in the restrictive 
trade practices are aware that they are taking part in an illegal activity. Some of the sectors may 
however be used to having some activities that may seem legal. Later on, when they discover it 
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is illegal, they may fear disclosing it.262 Also, since it is a first come first serve basis, the policy 
encourages an entity that discovers it is taking part in illegal activities to be fast enough to self-
report before another entity comes to report before it.263 
In as much as only the first entity in a cartel that comes forward is legible for immunity, if the 
other members may wish to come clean when a confession has already been made and 
immunity granted, the Commission may decide to explore other processes not provided for in 
the policy such as fine reduction, an agreement for settlement or even a consent order. Also, if 
the matter at hand is further referred to the Tribunal, the Commission may intervene on behalf 
of the first applicants to apply for immunity for them to be accorded favorable treatment.264  
The leniency policy does not apply in some instances. The first one is when the restrictive 
conduct does not fall within the scope that the Competition Act covers.265 Another instance is 
when another entity has already come forward and submitted its application for immunity in 
relation with the same activity and its application was successful.266 The leniency policy will 
also not apply where an entity does not meet any condition or requirements provided for in the 
policy.267 In such a situation, the Commission will then investigate the matter in accordance 
with the provisions of the Competition Act and all the members of the cartel, if they are found 
guilty, will be subjected to the penalties as provided for in the Act.268 
The leniency policy further provides that all the information will be treated confidentially. Any 
disclosure to be made will be made with the consent of the applicant as long as the applicant 
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3.2.1 Case scenarios in South Africa where the Leniency Policy has been applied 
 
The applications for leniency started with the airline industry and further spread to the milk 
industry and bread industry which eventually spread to other industries like the construction 
industry, transport industry and also the energy industry.270 
There is a popular known case in South Africa referred to as the “bread scandal”. The matter 
involved the Competition Commission and Pioneer Foods (Pty) Limited.271 In 2006, there was 
a complaint brought before the Commission. The complaint was brought against Premier 
Foods, Tiger Brands and Pioneer Foods where it was alleged that they formed part of cartels in 
the bread manufacturing industry.272 They fixed prices and also divided markets. There were 
two investigations. One was in the Western Cape region and the other one was a national 
complaint. After the commencement of the first investigation of the Western Cape by the 
Commission, Premier Foods made an application for leniency and indicated that they would 
co-operate fully. It disclosed that the other entities were involved in cartel activities by fixing 
pricing and also other conditions of trade. Premier went further to reveal that the cartel was in 
operation in various areas of the country and was involved in dividing markets in the various 
territories. This led to the opening of the second investigation by the Commission, which was 
the national complaint. 
Tiger Foods filed its reply to the complaint and later on approached the Tribunal with the aim 
of negotiating with the Commission in order to enter into an agreement to obtain a consent 
order. It cooperated by providing evidence regarding the bread cartel to the Commission. It 
further conducted its own internal investigations as to the bread cartel and found that the 
allegations were true. The Tribunal thereafter imposed on Tiger Foods a fine of R 98 874 869.90 
(ninety-eight million, eight hundred and seventy-four thousand, eight hundred and sixty-nine 
Rands) due to its involvement in the activities of the bread cartel. Further, Pioneer Foods denied 
being involved in the cartel. In the national complaint, Foodcorp, entered into an agreement 
for consent with the Commission and a fine of R45 406 359. 82 (forty-five million, four hundred 
and six thousand, three hundred and fifty-nine Rands) was imposed on it.  
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Pioneer Foods did not admit to taking part in the restrictive practices and instead of entering 
into a consent agreement like the other entities, it opted to go for trial. It also did not apply for 
leniency. Later on, during the hearing, Pioneer Foods conceded to the fact that it contravened 
the provisions of the Competition Act in respect to some of the alleged restrictive trade 
practices. 
As Pioneer food had previously refused to acknowledge that it was involved in cartel activities, 
it was to be subjected to heavy penalties in comparison to the other entities. In relation to the 
Western Cape, it was determined that Pioneer Foods, Premier Foods and Tiger Foods had 
contravened section 4 (1) (b) (i) and (ii) of the Competition Act which provides against fixing 
of the price of purchasing and the  price of selling either directly or indirectly or any other 
condition of trade. They were also involved in collusive tendering. Pioneer Foods was therefore 
subjected to the payment of a fine of R 46 019 954 (forty-six million, nineteen thousand, nine 
hundred and fifty-four Rands). 
In the national complaint, it was eventually determined that Pioneer Foods, Premier Foods and 
Tiger Brand were involved in a restrictive trade practice to fix trading conditions and agreed 
not to compete on the price or poach another’s customers. Pioneer Foods was given a cease 
and desist order to prevent it from continuing to take part in the cartel activities. It was subjected 
to the payment of a fine of R 149 698 660 (one hundred and forty-nine million, six hundred and 
ninety-eight thousand, six hundred and sixty Rands) within twenty days of the order. 
3.2.2   Challenges South Africa has faced in running the Leniency Policy  
 
The leniency programme as explained is still new in Kenya. Since it has been running in South 
Africa, the study looks at some of the challenges faced by South Africa so far in running the 
policy. The policy is seen as unconstitutional by some people such as the cartel members that 
have been prosecuted against as it is seen to only deal with cartels selectively.273 It is seen to 
contravene the constitutional provision of equality that states every person is considered equal 
before the law. They have the right to equal protection and benefit of the law.274 This means 
that the Commission may tend to favour some entities over others and grant them immunity 
while refusing to grant others. 
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The Competition Commission had a meeting addressing the challenges that they have faced in 
implementing the policy.275 One challenge has been implementing certain sections in the 
Competition Act. For instance, the 2009 Competition Amendment Act276 introduced section 
73A of the Competition Act that is still yet to been implemented to date due to controversy. It 
sought to punish individuals that let their firm take part in cartel activities. In this case, the 
directors. The main reason for its controversy was the fact that it went against certain 
constitutional provisions. This is because the Competition Tribunal or Appeal Court is required 
to give a finding confirming that such persons have been involved in restrictive trade practices. 
This is seen to infringe their constitutional rights such as the right to a fair trial; the right to be 
presumed innocent unless proven guilty and the right to be accorded adequate time and also 
adequate facilities that are required to enable one prepare for a defence.277 They are presumed 
guilty and not given a proper chance to have a proper defence and prepare for the trial. 
In addition to this, the Commission stated that two methods of assessment of cartel activities 
were provided for in the Competition Amendment Act. The first one was the civil processes 
that were directed at the conduct of the firm which was prosecuted by the Competition 
Commission.278  The second method was the criminal process that aimed at the conduct of 
directors and managers and they were to be prosecuted by the National Prosecution 
Authority.279 The Authorities are against the introduction of criminal sanctions as opposed to 
civil liabilities when it comes to cartels. This is because its implementation may be problematic 
as it involves the Competition Commission cooperating with the National Prosecuting 
Authority.280 National Prosecuting Authority is seen to have no experience in enforcement of 
competition law. They would need to cooperate and there may also be issues when it comes to 
coordination between the Competition Commission and the National Prosecuting Authority.281 
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Another challenge the Commission stated was that they had a huge number of litigation suits 
instituted against them especially on technical grounds.282 There were several interlocutory 
applications in the form of appeals and reviews. The Commission was of the view that they 
needed to restrict appeal rights.283 For instance, there was a case brought before the High Court 
in South Africa.284 The Commission was seen to have acted unlawfully and selectively. The 
third respondent in the matter, Consolidated Wire Industries (Pty) Ltd under the leniency 
policy had applied for conditional immunity. In exchange, it provided evidence of its 
participation in cartel conduct with the applicants and they were also involved with the fourth 
to the twelfth respondents. Due to this, the Commission made a promise for leniency to the 
third respondent in this matter which was considered unlawful. Further, in the Tribunal 
proceedings, it did not seek relief against the third respondent. It however sought relief against 
the other members involved in the cartel, hence selective. Further, the Commission granted the 
respondent conditional immunity without authority. Therefore, it was considered unlawful to 
refer the complaint to the Tribunal.  The matter on appeal proceed until the Supreme Court 
where it ruled in favour of the Tribunal. It was held that the conditional immunity was granted 
in accordance with the criteria as in the policy. Further, on addressing the issue of selective 
prosecution, the court held that just because the commissioner initiates a complaint against a 
certain member engaging in prohibited practices instead of all of them, does not render the 
practice unprohibited.  
Another challenge pointed out by the Commission was that there was an upcoming number of 
investigations and also referrals which led to the creation of capacity constraints and that 
required more resources when it came to solving cases. These demanded new ways of resolving 
the cases.285 
The Commission also pointed out that they had challenges regarding the abuse of dominance 
such as excessive pricing which related to the calculation of the economic value.286 Further, 
                                                          
282 Parliamentary Monitoring Group, ‘Competition Commission Legislation Implementation Challenges. 
283Parliamentary Monitoring Group, ‘Competition Commission Legislation Implementation Challenges. 
284 Agri Wire (Pty) Ltd and Another v Commissioner of the Competition Commission and Others (660/2011) [2012] 
ZASCA 134; [2012] 4 All SA 365 (SCA); 2013 (5) SA 484 (SCA) (27 September 2012). 
285 Parliamentary Monitoring Group, ‘Competition Commission Legislation Implementation Challenges’. 
286 Parliamentary Monitoring Group, ‘Competition Commission Legislation Implementation Challenges’. 
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when it came to predatory pricing,287 they had challenges defining average variable costs and 
marginal costs.288  When it came to determining price discrimination, the main challenge was 
the requirement of proof that the transactions between the different purchasers and those with 
different economies of scale were equal.289 Another challenge pointed out by the Commission 
in the area of market inquiries was resources. This was particularly human resources that were 
outsourced.290 
These are some of the challenges South Africa is facing when it comes to running the policy 
despite the efforts made to ensure cartel detection and curtailing of the cartel activities. It is 
important for Kenya and other jurisdictions intending on running the programme to note the 




This chapter was looking at the legal framework of South Africa in regards to competition law. 
South Africa has been taking step by step actions in reforming its competition laws to enable it 
to adapt any new issues that relate to competition law that may be arising. The leniency policy 
was enacted under the Competition Act in order to enable entities to voluntary report cartel 
activities that were taking place. The policy was enacted in 2004. It was however amended in 
2008. After the amendment is when an increased number of leniency applications was 
registered.  
                                                          
287 This involves setting very low prices in order to prevent other firms from competing therefore they are forced to 
leave the market. 
288 Parliamentary Monitoring Group, ‘Competition Commission Legislation Implementation Challenges’. 
289 Parliamentary Monitoring Group, ‘Competition Commission Legislation Implementation Challenges’.  




CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS ON REFORMING KENYA’S 
COMPETITION LAW FRAMEWORK WITH TRANSPLANTABLE SOLUTIONS 
FROM SOUTH AFRICA 
4. Introduction 
 
This chapter gives the conclusion of my research based on the findings and also 
recommendations on how Kenya can improve its competition law and effectively run the 
corporate leniency programme. The rationale for introducing the programme was in good faith. 
However, Kenya needs to address the loopholes in order to have an effective competition 
regulation regime. The recommendations are based on the comparison with South Africa’s 
current Competition Act and also its leniency policy. Further recommendations given are also 
based on the challenges that South Africa has experienced in implementing its policy. Once 
Kenya notes the challenges South Africa has been facing, it will be able to devise methods that 
would enable it to avert facing similar challenges to ensure the smooth running of the 
programme.    
4.1  Conclusion based on the study of the competition legal frameworks of both Kenya 
and South Africa 
 
The conclusion seeks to answer the research questions based on the findings. Looking at the 
current corporate leniency programme, it will not fulfil its main objective of curtailing cartel 
activities unless the loopholes and ambiguities as pointed out in the research are addressed. The 
guidelines should be made clear in order for any applicant to be encouraged to apply for 
leniency based on assurances by the CAK. Some of these assurances as discussed include the 
CAK taking up the initiative to assure the applicants that even if their application for leniency 
is not successful and the matter proceeds to the Tribunal, the CAK may intervene on the 
applicant’s behalf before the Tribunal to give less severe penalties for the applicant as long as it 
fully cooperates with CAK. This and other assurances ensure the programme is run smoothly 
and effectively and it promotes competition law.  
The guidelines alone would not be sufficient when it comes to curtailing cartel activities and 
promoting competition in Kenya. This is because apart from the leniency programme 
guidelines, the issues pointed out in the Competition Act should also be addressed as they also 
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affect the leniency programme. This will ensure an effective competition law regime. It is 
important to have proper competition law as other guidelines and rules are derived from it. 
Therefore, when you have an ineffective competition law, the other rules and guidelines derived 
from it are also ineffective. 
 
Further, as previously discussed, challenges such as lack of awareness should be addressed. 
This is in order to ensure the effective running of this programme, the government should 
ensure that there is sensitization of the programme as most people may not be not aware of the 
existence of such a programme and how it works. The government should come up with 
sensitization programmes and other training mechanisms that will ensure that the public is 
made aware of the existence of the programme and educated on how it works. This will 
encourage people to come clean and will assist in reducing cartel activities in Kenya. 
Cooperation between enforcement authorities such as the CAK and the Office of the Director 
of Public Prosecution should be encouraged. Both authorities should be involved in mutual 
cooperation in order to ensure the effective running of the programme.  
4.2 Recommendations based on the study of the competition legal frameworks of both 
Kenya and South Africa 
4.2.1 Legislative Reforms 
4.2.1.1 Reform on Kenya’s current Competition Law 
  
1. Creation of Specialized courts 
South Africa has the Competition Commission, the Tribunal and the Appeal Court. The 
Competition Appeal court is specialized for hearing appeals from the Tribunal. In Kenya the 
matters are heard by CAK and then the Competition Tribunal. Any appeal from the Tribunal 
is to be taken to the High Court of Kenya. To avoid backlog of cases and lengthy process of 
determining such cases from the Tribunal, Kenya should borrow a leaf from South Africa by 
creating a specialized court that should deal with the matters of appeal from the Tribunal. This 
would ensure that appeal matters in competition law are handled effectively and in good time. 
It avoids backlog of appeals from the Tribunal and also avoids rushing to determine cases 




2. Creation of a further room for appeal for aggrieved parties 
When a party goes up to the High Court and is still aggrieved, Competition Law of Kenya 
should consider allowing for room for appeal to the Court of Appeal and also the Supreme 
Court even if it is to be based on certain limitations. When you look at South Africa, aggrieved 
parties may appeal further from the Competition Appeal Court to the Supreme Court of Appeal 
or the Constitution Court.291 Kenya may also consider having certain limitations so that even 
though not all the matters go through to the Court of Appeal, there is still a chance that certain 
cases may be heard if the parties feel aggrieved. The High Court’s decision should not be final. 
3. Creation of an Oversight Authority 
There is also the accountability aspect. There should be a clear and defined body that the CAK 
and the Competition Tribunal are accountable to in Kenya as in South Africa. In Kenya it is 
not expressly provided for and one would be left to speculate the body that CAK and the 
Tribunal are accountable to. This is unlike South Africa where it is clear that the Competition 
Commission, Competition Tribunal and the Competition Appeal Court are accountable to 
South Africa’s Department of Economic Development.292 
4. Review of the penalty provisions 
When you look at the penalties’ provisions in the Kenyan Competition Act, it should make 
provisions on what is to happen when one is given an order by the CAK and the Tribunal but 
fails to adhere to it. The Act only provides for penalties when one is found taking part in 
restrictive trade practices but not when they defy an order. 
It is important to have a comprehensive competition law because that is where the leniency 
programme originates from. This is also because the rules of competition law also apply in the 
leniency programme. Without a comprehensive competition law, the leniency programme will 
not be effectively applied. 
 
 
                                                          
291 Section 62(4), Competition Act (South Africa). 
292 Competition Commission, South Africa −http://www.compcom.co.za/about-us-2/. 
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4.2.1.2  Reform on Kenya’s current Corporate Leniency Programme  
 
Looking at the challenges that may come about in implementation of the corporate leniency 
programme, there is a lot of ambiguity that needs to be dealt with when you look at Kenya’s 
corporate leniency programme. The recommendations proposed include:  
1. Amendment of the scope of leniency 
The programme should provide for how the entities involved in cartel activities without the 
knowledge that such activities are illegal are to be treated. They are to be considered as provided 
for in South Africa’s leniency policy.293 This is because Kenya’s leniency programme only 
provides for leniency for the first party to come forward. It should provide for the rest of the 
members of the cartel who were not aware that it was illegal and decided to come forward as 
soon as they realized it was illegal. Further, those entities may not be the first ones to approach 
the CAK for leniency but during the investigations, they may become aware that the conduct 
was illegal. The programme should provide for a way forward for such entities to avoid 
uncertainty of what would happen to them. 
2. Proper definition of an applicant 
 The leniency programme should define who an applicant should be. It is clear in South Africa’s 
policy that the applicant should be one authorized by an entity to act for them. The rest of 
applicants would only be considered as whistle blowers.294 It is important for Kenya to have a 
proper definition of an applicant, whether it should be any employee or a director or any 
authorized person in order to avoid any confusion that may arise when it comes to applying for 
leniency. 
3. Include a provision for those not first to approach the CAK when the matter goes 
before the Tribunal 
Another issue is that when it comes to granting of immunity for the first to approach the CAK. 
The CAK should also intervene for the other entities that were not the first to approach when 
it deems fit when the matter goes to the Tribunal in order to have their penalties reduced. The 
CAK only offers penalties reduction for matters that are before it for entities that were not the 
                                                          
293 Section 3.7, Corporate Leniency Policy (South Africa). 
294 Section 5.8, Corporate Leniency Policy (South Africa). 
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first to approach it for leniency295 but does not address what would happen to the matters that 
go before the Tribunal. The South Africa policy considers this and assures the other parties that 
were not the first to approach the Commission that if the matter is referred to the Tribunal, it 
may intervene and suggest less penalties for them.296 This provision would encourage more 
entities to cooperate and assist the CAK in the investigation as they are assured that even if the 
matter goes to the Tribunal, they will receive leniency.  
4. Include a provision for application for leniency in Kenya when already granted in 
another jurisdiction 
The leniency programme should also be clear on application for immunity when an entity has 
been granted leniency in another jurisdiction. It should be clear whether the entity is to apply 
for fresh immunity or that the immunity will apply in the Kenyan jurisdiction as well. On the 
same matter, it should also be clear whether an entity that is granted immunity in one activity, 
the immunity will spread to the other activities or the entity has to apply afresh for immunity. 
These should expressly be provided for as in the South Africa policy297 in order to avoid 
ambiguity. 
5. Include a provision on whether once pardoned one would be free from civil or 
criminal suits from other aggrieved parties 
The leniency programme should further provide whether once one is granted immunity, they 
are completely free from any other civil or criminal suits by other parties aggrieved by their 
activities or whether such suits can still be instituted against them. This should be made clear 
as in the policy in South Africa that gives a disclaimer that being granted immunity does not 
prevent them from further civil or criminal suits by other parties.298 It is important to address 
such ambiguities in order for such entities to be fully aware of what to expect even after the 
process of investigation and a decision is made. 
 
 
                                                          
295 Section 13, Leniency Programme Guidelines (Kenya). 
296 Section 5.6, Corporate Leniency Policy (South Africa). 
297 Section 5.9, Corporate Leniency Policy (South Africa). 
298 Section 6.4, Corporate Leniency Policy (South Africa). 
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6. Cater for unsuccessful applicants in as long as they cooperate with CAK 
The CAK should also consider unsuccessful applicants for leniency and offer to grant them 
lenient approaches as long as they cooperate with the CAK. This is provided for in the policy 
in South Africa.299 When the CAK considers using such an approach, it encourages applicants 
to apply for leniency and cooperate with it in their investigations even though they are not sure 
that their application will go through. 
7. Proper communication channels by CAK 
The CAK should also consider using proper communication channels with the applicants 
within reasonable timelines. For instance, once an entity has applied for leniency, it should be 
informed in good time whether there was another applicant before it. In South Africa’s case, 
the applicant is informed within five days that there was already an applicant before it.300 In 
Kenya however, it takes fourteen days for the CAK to communicate and inform the applicant 
whether their application was successful or not.301 The CAK should also give the successful 
applicant a reasonably specified timeline on when to set the first meeting with the CAK. The 
guidelines only provide that a successful applicant may set up the first meeting with CAK but 
it does not give specific timelines. When you look at South Africa, it has specified five days or 
a reasonable time for the setting up of the first meeting with the Commission.302 This is 
important as it makes the programme more efficient.  
8. Increase the scope of the purpose of the meetings with CAK 
Further, when it comes to the meeting with the CAK, the leniency guidelines should be more 
thorough when it comes to detailing the scope and the purpose of each meeting with the CAK 
as the policy in South Africa is. It should clearly outline the purpose of the meetings and the 
requirements of the meetings as well as provide for the process of investigations, analysis and 
verification of the information it receives in detail. It should go into details as to the 
requirements of the meetings with the applicants and what is to be expected from the applicants 
from the first meeting until the final meeting.  
                                                          
299Section 7.2, Corporate Leniency Policy (South Africa).  
300 Section 11.1.1.2, Corporate Leniency Policy (South Africa). 
301 Section 23, Leniency Programme Guidelines (Kenya). 
302 Section 11.1.1.3, Corporate Leniency Policy (South Africa). 
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In the first meeting, the CAK should go in depth as to the requirements of the first meeting 
including the full identity of the applicants in case they had made an anonymous application. 
For the second meeting, the guidelines should allow for room for an applicant to introduce 
further evidence required for the investigation. The guidelines should also expound the 
investigation process and provide for the methods of investigation that they would use such as 
interviews or other methods they deem fit. Further, as seen in South Africa’s policy, it is 
important for the CAK to be open and inform the applicant during the final meeting whether it 
intends to proceed with instituting proceedings against the entities involved in the cartel 
conduct. South Africa’s policy goes ahead to inform the applicant in the final meeting that if 
the applicant intends to withdraw their application at that point it would be at their own risk 
and they would still be dealt with in accordance with the Act.303 This is an important disclaimer 
that should be included in the leniency programme in Kenya in case the applicant decides to 
withdraw their application at that point. 
9. Clarity on the number of times an applicant can be pardoned 
The programme should also be clear on the number of times a particular entity can be pardoned. 
This is to prevent entities from taking advantage of the programme by taking part in the 
restrictive practices knowing that they will apply for leniency and be pardoned once they feel 
that they have achieved their goals by engaging in a certain restrictive practice. This has also 
not been provided for in the policy in South Africa. 
In Kenya, there are no cited cases of entities that have come before the CAK to apply for 
leniency. It could be because entities do not really trust the process or may not be aware of the 
existence of the leniency programme. Most entities are aware of the existence of competition 
law but may not be aware of the existence of the leniency programme. To ensure the effective 
running of this programme, the government should ensure that there is sensitization of the 
programme as most people may not be not aware of its existence and how it works. The 
government should come up with sensitization programmes and other training mechanisms 
that will ensure that the public is made aware of the existence of the programme and educated 
on how it works. This will encourage people to come clean and will render the programme 
effective in reducing cartel activities in Kenya. 
 
                                                          
303 Section 11.1.5.2, Corporate Leniency Policy (South Africa). 
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When you look at the leniency programme guidelines in Kenya in comparison with the leniency 
policy in South Africa, there is still much to be desired. There is a lot of ambiguity in some areas 
of the guidelines which the CAK should consider revising. Regulations that are clear without 
ambiguity are more effective when it comes to their application. 
4.2.2  Recommendations based on challenges experienced by South Africa’s leniency 
policy 
 
1. Uphold the constitutional rights of the parties involved 
The CAK should ensure that it practices the rule of law and deal with cartel members 
impartially and independently without any fear or favour as provided for in the Competition 
Act.304 The Commission in South Africa has faced accusations that it deals with issues in an 
unconstitutional manner when it comes to dealing with the cartels. It is alleged that it tends to 
favour some cartels over others therefore dealing with them differently yet everyone is equal 
before the law.  
The CAK should further ensure that when proceedings are instituted against cartels, they 
accord them their constitutional rights such as their right to a fair trial; their right to be presumed 
innocent unless proven guilty and the right to have adequate time and adequate facilities 
required to prepare for a defence.305 
2. Cooperation between authorities involved in law enforcement 
On the issue of coordination between Authorities, there is the provision for civil liabilities and 
criminal liabilities. In Kenya the CAK may have to work hand in hand with the Office of the 
Director of Public Prosecution when dealing with cartels. Both authorities should ensure that 
they cooperate as they have the same goal in order to ensure smooth running of the entire 
process. In South Africa, it is alleged that the National Prosecuting Authority is seen to have 
no experience in enforcement of competition law. Kenya should look at this and even consider 
having workshops and seminars for both authorities and even other parties that may be involved 
in order to educate and share on the enforcement of competition law and even discuss on how 
to collaborate when dealing with cartels. 
                                                          
304 Section 7, Competition Act (Act No. 12 of 2010). 
305 Article 50, Constitution of Kenya (2010). 
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The Commission in South Africa is facing a number of litigation suits based on their decisions. 
Some matters have proceeded to the Supreme Court. The CAK should ensure that it deals with 
the issues before it properly without leaving room for suspicion of favorism. It should make 
sound decisions to avoid suits against it. It should ensure that its decisions are fair in order to 
avoid its matters being overturned by the Tribunal or even the High Court. This is also because 
having several decisions overturned on appeal would show that the CAK is inefficient. 
3. Increase resources and ensure accountability on the use of the resources 
On the issue of limited resources, the government should ensure that the CAK has enough 
resources to facilitate the whole process of investigation until the decision-making stage. The 
CAK should also ensure that it does not mismanage the funds allocated to it but put the funds 
into good use for the sole purpose of running the entire process. The CAK should also be made 
accountable for the use of resources by making reports on the matters that it has handled and 
also giving the breakdown of how it used the resources allocated to it. This ensures efficiency, 
accountability and responsibility.  
4. Invest in qualified experts on technical matters 
The CAK should also ensure that it engages a sufficient number of experts to assist in matters 
that may be technical. The experts would assist in determining the abuse of dominance such as 
excessive pricing which would involve calculation of the economic value. On predatory pricing 
the experts would assist in defining average variable costs and marginal costs. Further, on 
determining price discrimination, the experts would help find proof that the transactions 
between the different purchasers and those with different economies scale were equal.  
5. Invest in quality human resource 
In addition to that, the CAK should also invest in human resource that are qualified to work in 
the CAK in the various departments and even on the management level. They should be 
conversant with the competition law policies. Having qualified people also ensures that the 
CAK is run smoothly and conducts its functions effectively. In South Africa, the greatest 
challenge as seen was the workload but limited employees. It was suggested that the 
Commission to have permanent jobs instead of contract jobs.306 This would be effective as it 
                                                          
306Parliamentary Monitoring Group, ‘Competition Commission Legislation Implementation Challenges’. 
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ensures that experienced people stay in the position and from gaining experience, they then 
become experts in the sector. Having jobs on a contractual basis in some cases may lead to 
having inefficient employees.  
The CAK may encounter some of these challenges as the running of the leniency programme 
progresses. Some of the recommendations listed have also been proposed by South Africa. It 
would be important for the CAK to look at these challenges facing South Africa and since it is 
still new, it should use the measures proposed to avoid them early enough in order to avoid 
facing them when the programme is fully running. This would ensure that the leniency 
programme runs smoothly and effectively and it will also reduce cartel activities. 
4.3 Recommendations based on cooperation with Regional Bodies  
 
The CAK has also fostered relationships with COMESA and EAC and the challenges 
COMESA is facing when it comes to dealing with the various countries was discussed in 
chapter 2. Kenya should ensure that it cooperates with EAC, COMESA and the other regional 
bodies that it is part of in order to ensure a smooth process of curbing cartels. Kenya should not 
make it difficult in ways such as imposing restrictions that will curtail information sharing. It 
should also ensure that it fosters mutual cooperation when it comes to information sharing to 
promote cooperation especially with cartel activities involving several jurisdictions. 
4.4 Predictions 
 
Owing to the harsh economic conditions caused by the effects of Covid-19, most entities are 
making losses, and their dwindling finances will likely trigger them to engage in restrictive 
practices (cartel formation) in order to stay afloat or ahead of their peers. It is common 
knowledge that corporations exist for the primary purpose of making profits for their 
shareholders, and if this aim is disabled, shareholders, especially in public companies, might 
consider the need to deploy their capital elsewhere. In that race to survive, corporations more 
than before, will be eager to lessen competition by fixing prices, dividing markets and such other 
restrictive practices that have been discussed in this study. 
Going forward, it will be more difficult for Competition Authority of Kenya to detect cartel 
activities as most entities will begin to see them a do-or-die affair, and the most assured self-
help approach to survive the economic turbulence. In that situation, it will be easier to convince 
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hesitant companies to join a cartel, and self-reporting based on the current rules, will be grossly 
insufficient to combat the heightened number of cartels. As a consequence, consumer prices of 
goods and services will rise astronomically and households and small businesses will become 
poorer, thereby making it difficult for the Kenyan economy to recover within a reasonable time.  
The CAK will therefore need to be more vigilant and significantly improve their efforts in 
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